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Abstract
We estimate the effect of state judiciary presence on rent extraction in local governments.
We measure rents as irregularities related to waste or corruption uncovered by auditors. Our
unique dataset at the level of individual inspections allows us to separately examine extensive and
intensive margins of rent extraction. The identi￿cation strategy is based on an institutional rule of
state judiciary branches in Brazil according to which prosecutors and judges tend to be assigned
to the most populous among contiguous counties forming a judiciary district. Our research design
exploits this rule by comparing counties that are largest in their district to counties with identical
population size from other districts in the same state, where they are not the most populous. IV
estimates suggest that state judiciary presence reduces the share of inspections with irregularities
related to waste or corruption by about 10 percent or 0.3 standard deviations. In contrast, we ￿nd
no effect on the intensive margin of rent extraction. Finally, our estimates suggest that judicial
presence reduces rent extraction only when mayors have re-election incentives.
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11 Introduction
There is a fair amount of consensus among both academics and policy-makers that institutions
that constrain executive power are bene￿cial for economic development.1 An important example
is the judicial check on executive (and legislative) power, enshrined in constitutions around the
world, which has been shown to be a determinant of political and economic freedom (La Porta,
L￿pez-de-Silanes, Pop-Eleches and Shleifer, 2004), while the evidence on economic growth is
mixed (Glaeser, La Porta, L￿pez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 2004; Feld and Voigt, 2003).2 However,
open and contentious questions remain. For example, ideal measures of checks on the executive
should re￿ect permanent constraints, rather than policies or constraints that may exist only on pa-
per. Moreover, there is considerable debate about econometric identi￿cation of the causal link be-
tween various outcomes and institutions more generally (since institutions themselves likely re￿ect
collective choices). In part, the existing debates are inherent to the nature of cross-country com-
parisons, which typically rely on aggregated measures of institutions and in which identi￿cation of
causal effects is notoriously dif￿cult.3 A complementary approach, advocated and summarized in
Pande and Udry (2006), is to analyze institutions in a within-country context where measurement
and identi￿cation issues can be more easily addressed.
Our paper provides the ￿rst evidence on the role of the judiciary in constraining executive
power based on micro-data, focusing on rent extraction by the executive branch. Rather than
evaluating independence of the judiciary as in the macro literature, we focus on physical presence
of state judicial institutions in the local community.4 In the case of the local governments in Brazil
considered here, there is no variation in the extent of judicial independence across municipalities
because state-level prosecutors and judges are the ones who provide the checks on local of￿cials.5
1For the view that constraints on the executive cause economic growth see the work of Knack and Keefer (1995),
Mauro (1995), Hall and Jones (1999), Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001, 2002, 2005), Acemoglu and Johnson
(2005) among others. For the alternative view that economic growth causes institutional improvement see Barro (1999),
Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub and Limongi (2000), Glaeser, La Porta, L￿pez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2004), Przeworski
(2004a, 2004b)andGlaeserandSaks(2006). PandeandUdry(2006)provideacomprehensivesurveyoftheentireliterature
on institutions and development.
2Glaeser et al. (2004) measure independence of the judiciary based on tenure of judges while Feld and Voigt use an
index based on 23 characteristics of the judiciary. Feld and Voigt also construct an index of de facto judicial independence,
which turns out to be positively correlated with economic growth, while de iure judicial independence is not.
3See Acemoglu (2005) for a review of empirical challenges in comparative political economy.
4For simplicity we refer to "state judicial presence", "local judicial presence" or simply "judicial presence", rather than
"physical presence of state judicial institutions at the local level".
5Municipalities are the lowest level of government in Brazil (below the federal and state governments). The discussion
refers to local governments, counties, communities or municipalities interchangeably.
2Less than half of municipalities in Brazil have a local judicial presence and for the vast majority
of them, judicial presence is a permanent feature of the local institutional environment, rather
than a policy that shifts with prevailing political winds. We use detailed knowledge about the
institutional design of Brazil’s state judiciary systems to identify the causal effect of state judicial
presence (clearly itself a choice variable) on rent extraction by local of￿cials. We measure rent
extraction (including low effort on the job) as infractions of public management regulations by the
local executive branch as revealed by auditors.6 Our micro-data thus allow us to shed light on a
key policy decision by the executive branch on which the judicial check might operate.
Theoretically, we think of judicial presence as a factor that affects the cost of rent extraction
by local incumbent politicians and public servants.7 Local of￿cials might be exposed to a higher
probability of detection in counties with local judicial presence compared to counties without such
presence, becausethegeneralpublicfaceslowertransactioncoststoreportirregularities. Similarly,
local of￿cials may perceive a higher probability of punishment when the state prosecutor lives in
town because he faces lower transaction costs for his investigations.8 Alternatively, local elites
might ￿nd it easier to capture state judiciary of￿cials when they reside in the same county, which
would presumably lower the probability of punishment and increase the incidence of infractions.9
The effect of judicial presence on rent extraction by local public agents may thus work through a
multitude of channels, and the net effect is a priori ambiguous.
We address potential endogeneity of local judicial presence by exploiting an institutional fea-
ture of state judiciary systems in Brazil: although state judiciary branches provide services to all
counties in a given state, only those counties that are suf￿ciently large in terms of observable
characteristics may become a judiciary district (comarca in Portuguese) by themselves and get a
physical presence of judges and prosecutors. State-speci￿c laws specify necessary￿although not
suf￿cient￿conditions for the creation of judiciary districts in terms of population size and typ-
6In our context, local legislators play a minor role compared to the local executive (mayors and program administrators).
7See Persson and Tabellini (2000) for formal models that typically yield the prediction that equilibrium rents, de￿ned as
private gains from holding of￿ce, are decreasing in transaction costs.
8Unfortunately, information on prosecutions from the 26 state judiciary branches is not readily available for outside
researchers, and in fact not even for the central government. It is not clear what we could learn from comparing prosecutions
across countiesevenif we had accessto these data, however, since prosecutions are endogenouslydetermined. Forexample,
if judicial presence increases the perceived probability of prosecution, local managers and politicians would commit fewer
infractions and as a result there would be fewer prosecutions in counties with judicial presence, not more.
9See Bardhan and Mookherjee (2000) for the trade-off between local information and capture under centralized vs.
decentralized delivery of public services. See Stigler (1971) on state capture by interest groups. See R￿os-Figueroa (2007)
for an argument linking judiciary effectiveness to political fragmentation.
3ically a subset of other characteristics, such as geographical area, size of the electorate, county
￿scal revenue and judicial caseload. Roughly 75% of all counties do not become their own ju-
diciary district. These counties are grouped together with contiguous neighbors by the judiciary,
and only one of them becomes the local judiciary seat (sede da comarca) and gets the physical
presence of prosecutors and judges.10 Although state laws typically do not specify which county
should be the seat of the judiciary district in these cases,11 the internally used assignment rule is
to locate the seat in the most populous county because this minimizes transaction costs to access
judicial services for citizens.12
Our research design exploits this rule by using as an instrument for local judicial presence an
indicator for whether or not a county has the highest population in its judiciary district.13 Essen-
tially, our reduced form compares counties that are largest in their district to counties with identical
population size from other districts in the same state, where they are not the most populous. Our
instrumental variable (IV) approach explicitly allows for the possibility that judicial presence is
correlated with unobserved factors that also affect outcomes￿even conditional on population￿
since we only use variation in judicial presence induced by district-speci￿c population rank.14 The
approach relies on three main identifying assumptions. First, conditional on population, district
maximum population is mean independent of unobserved factors that affect outcomes (conditional
independence). Second, district maximum population affects rent extraction only through local ju-
dicial presence, not through other channels (exclusion restriction). Third, the probability of having
a judiciary presence in the municipality jumps when the municipality is largest within its district,
conditional on population (￿rst stage). In Section 4 below we discuss how we test these assump-
tions (to the extent this is possible).
Our measure of rent extraction in local governments is based on audit reports stemming from a
policy of randomly selecting Brazilian municipalities for an inspection of federal transfers, which
we refer to as the random audits program. Following the terminology of the federal internal au-
10We have no information about how the judiciary groups counties into judiciary districts.
11The two exceptions we know of are the states of Mato Grosso and Mato Grosso do Sul, where the law explicitly
prescribes that the seat of the judiciary district must be located in the most populous county or the one which is easiest to
reach (C￿digo de Organiza￿ªo JudiciÆria, Art. 8 and Art. 11, respectively).
12Private correspondence with judges and technical judiciary staff in various states.
13See Andrabi, Das, and Khwaja (2007) for a similar approach used to identify the effect of establishing government
girls’ schools on subsequent supply of private education.
14Note that our approach requires weaker identifying assumptions than assuming that judicial presence is exogenous
conditional on population.
4dit agency (Controladoria-Geral da Uniªo, CGU), we usually refer to the infractions of public
management regulations by local government of￿cials revealed in these reports as irregularities in
public management. The irregularities reported by auditors range from improper ￿nancial report-
ing, over lack of oversight in project implementation, to waste and actual theft of public resources.
Because of the random sampling, the types and incidence of irregularities are representative of
problems in the local public sector in Brazil. If compliance with homogeneous national regu-
lations is socially bene￿cial, deviations from the standard provide an objective measure of rent
extraction by local executive of￿cials, either through outright corruption or low effort on the job.15
For the vast majority of the regulations considered by auditors in Brazil, compliance is likely to
be socially bene￿cial because many of these standards re￿ect international best practices in public
￿nancial management (PEFA, 2006).16
Our measure of rents is based on the same reports as the corruption measures in Ferraz and
Finan (2008, 2010), with two important differences. The ￿rst difference is that we focus on irregu-
larities overall, rather than likely instances of corruption.17 After all, corruption is only one type of
rent extraction.18 Moreover, corruption represents only a small fraction of irregularities uncovered
by auditors as shown in Ferraz and Finan (2010).19 In addition to inevitable ambiguities in the
identi￿cation of corruption episodes, our main reason for focusing on overall irregularities is that
the law is not limited to penalizing corruption, which requires a relatively high standard of proof
because individuals can go to jail if convicted, but allows prosecutors to charge individuals with the
lesser offense of "acts of administrative misconduct". Since the judicial check should operate on
both waste and corruption, a comprehensive measure of rents is more appropriate for our purposes.
However, we do distinguish management irregularities, giving direct evidence of waste or corrup-
tion in the local provision of public services, from what we call procedural irregularities, such as
15Effort can be seen as negative rents as in Barro (1973) and Persson and Tabellini (2000).
16In the terminology of Bandiera, Prat and Valletti (2009) we think of irregularities uncovered by auditors as a measure
of active waste in government spending: compliance is socially bene￿cial yet privately costly. If, in contrast, public
management regulations were essentially red tape￿and compliance therefore of limited or no social value￿irregularities
would correspond to lower passive waste.
17FerrazandFinancodeanirregularityasaninstanceofcorruptioninthefollowingcases: fundsdisappearfrommunicipal
bank accounts, there is no proof of purchase and suppliers con￿rm that goods or services were not delivered, auditors
determine that there was over-invoicing, public contracts were awarded to friends and the public good was not provided.
18See Rose-Ackermann (1999, 2004) for a review of the empirical literature on poor governance, corruption and devel-
opment. See Aidt (2003) for a review of the theoretical literature.
19This is evident from the line "Share of audited items" in Table 1 of their paper, showing that the average number of
corruption episodes per audited item, conditional on at least one irregularity in the municipality, is 0.067. In contrast, the
(unconditional) average number of mismanagement episodes per audited item in their data is about 1.647.
5irregular or non-existent ￿nancial reports, where the connection to inef￿ciency is only indirect, and
for which local of￿cials are less likely to get punished a priori.20
The second difference with other codings of the Brazilian municipal audit reports is that our
unique micro-data at the level of individual inspections allow us to separately examine the exten-
sive margin of rent extraction (share of inspections with at least one irregularity) and the intensive
margin (number of irregularities per inspections with at least one irregularity). This decomposition
is new and important because it allows us to distinguish a situation in which there are irregular-
ities in most or all inspections from a situation in which many irregularities are concentrated in
just a few inspections. The decomposition also allows us to test not just whether but how judicial
presence (or any other institution or policy) affects rent extraction by the local executive branch.
In Section 3 below we show that from a descriptive standpoint, the distinction between extensive
and intensive margins of rent extraction matters a great deal: 35 percent of all inspections came up
entirely clean￿without any evidence of procedural or management irregularities￿while a full 55
to 61 percent showed no direct evidence that public resources were wasted or stolen.
Our main empirical result is that local presence of state judicial institutions reduces the share
of inspections with irregularities related to waste or corruption (the extensive margin) by about 10
percent or 0.3 standard deviations. While we show that judicial presence also reduces irregularities
overall, the effect turns out to be driven exclusively by a reduction in irregularities indicating waste
or corruption, rather than procedural irregularities. This result is consistent with the intuition that
less serious infractions are less likely to be detected by the public and prosecuted by the judiciary.
Consequently, such infractions should respond less to judicial presence or not at all. The result
also suggests that the reduction in irregularities is unlikely to be driven by a better understand-
ing of public management regulations and hence better compliance in counties with local judicial
presence, rather than a deterrence effect, since better understanding would presumably affect pro-
cedural irregularities more than those indicating waste or corruption. As further discussed below,
these results are robust to the inclusion of detailed municipality and mayor characteristics as in
Ferraz and Finan (2010) and to alternative de￿nitions of mismanagement vs. procedural irregular-
ities.
20Our management irregularities roughly correspond to the "mismanagement" category in Ferraz and Finan (2010). The
sample average of management irregularities per inspections across municipalities in our data is about 1 (our Table 2).
6In contrast, there is no evidence of an effect when we use as dependent variable the total number
of irregularities divided by either the number of inspections with at least one irregularity (the
intensive margin) or by the number of total inspections (the product of extensive and intensive
margins). We omit the latter results to save space. One interpretation of these ￿ndings is that the
effectofjudicialpresenceisheterogeneousacrossagentsandsomeofthemaresimplynotdeterred.
An alternative interpretation is that there might be signi￿cant measurement error in the number of
irregularities as a result of non-standardized reporting and the interaction between the discovery of
irregularities and further inspections, leading to noisier estimates when the number of irregularities
is used in the numerator. Indeed, some of the reported irregularities may simply describe various
aspects of the same underlying problem that different auditors report in different ways. In contrast,
the share of inspections with at least one irregularity should be measured more accurately since
auditor discretion plays no role in determining irregularities on the intensive margin.
We also investigate whether the effect of local presence of the judiciary on rent extraction
depends on the mayor’s re-election incentives, the main focus of Ferraz and Finan (2010). They
show that mayors in their ￿rst term in of￿ce (those with re-election incentives) are less corrupt
compared to mayors in their second term (who cannot run again immediately because of weak
term limits). Although these authors do not attempt to identify the causal effect of local judiciary
presence (they call it judiciary district), they ￿nd that in counties with judicial presence the effect
of re-election incentives on corruption is reduced. Using our broader measure of rents, in contrast,
we ￿nd just the opposite: re-election incentives increase the effect of local judiciary presence.21
In fact, for mayors in their second term, local judicial presence does not seem to matter at all. Put
differently, our estimates suggest that judicial presence reduces rent extraction only when mayors
have re-election incentives. This might indicate that judicial presence operates mostly through an
increased probability of detection, which disciplines incumbents with re-election incentives, rather
thananincreasedprobabilityofprosecutionorconviction, whichshouldalsodisciplineincumbents
without re-election incentives. This interpretation is consistent with the fact that actual convictions
of majors and other local of￿cials are very rare events in Brazil (Arantes, 2004).
21There is no reason to expect our results to be similar to those reported in Ferraz and Finan (2010) because of our sample
restrictions (excluding single-municipality judiciary districts, as well as municipalities with population above 40’000), a
different outcome variable (broad rents vs. corruption), and our instrumentation for judicial presence.
7The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the audits program and give institu-
tional background on the role of the state judiciary in providing a check on local executive power in
Brazil. In Section 3 we present our data on irregularities in local public management and describe
how it relates to existing datasets that are also based on the audit reports. We discuss the territorial
organization of the judiciary, identi￿cation and our estimation approach in Section 4. Results are
presented in Section 5. We conclude with a discussion of limitations and extensions.
2 Audits program and institutional background
2.1 The random audits program
The random audits program was initiated under the government of Luiz InÆcio Lula da Silva in
March 2003 with the explicit objective of ￿ghting corruption and waste in local public spending.
Most municipalities were eligible for federal audit from the start of the program with the excep-
tion of state capitals.22 Several rounds of sampling occur each year through a public lottery. The
machinery used for the selection of municipalities is the same as that used for a popular national
(money) lottery and results are broadcast on television and through other media. As of July 2010,
33 rounds have been carried out with 60 counties sampled in recent rounds. Sampling is geograph-
ically strati￿ed by state. Larger states tended to have lower sampling probabilities in the beginning
of the program but probabilities have converged to around 1%. There is little doubt that county
sampling is random.
The program is implemented by the general comptroller’s of￿ce (CGU), the internal audit in-
stitution of the federal government. When a county is selected, the CGU headquarters in Brasilia
determines the speci￿c aspects of programs and projects that are audited and issues detailed inspec-
tion orders (ordens de servi￿o)￿standardized sets of program- or project-speci￿c inspections￿to
state CGU branches. For simplicity we will usually refer to service orders as inspections, although
technically service orders are sets of inspections. Teams of auditors that are based in these state
branches are then sent to the sampled county. Transfers eligible for audit include those that are
earmarked to carry out national health and education policies (legais), direct transfers to citizens
22More speci￿cally, eligibility for federal audit is based on a population threshold which was successively increased from
20’000 to 500’000.
8(diretas), as well as other negotiated transfers (voluntarias), but exclude revenue-sharing transfers,
such as those from the Fundo de Participa￿ªo dos Munic￿pios. Inspections occur for a subset of
eligible federal transfers made during the preceding two to three years.23
The number of auditors dispatched depends on county size (area and population), the propor-
tion of rural and urban areas and the number of inspection orders, which in turn depends on the
number of programs and projects running in the municipality. For instance, a county with a small
population and a low number of items to be checked, but with a large rural area may require more
auditors than another county with larger population but more people living in urban areas. In ad-
dition, municipalities for which the CGU has received a lot of complaints or where the mayor was
recently impeached, receive larger teams.
Within a week of the county sampling, auditors spend about two weeks in the county in order
to carry out their inspection orders. The quality of public services is assessed through interviews
with the local population and service staff members. Auditors then write a report which details
all the irregularities encountered during their mission. Reports include the amounts of resources
audited, and if possible, any fraction that was diverted, wasted or stolen. This fraction is just a
preliminary estimate, however. The exact amount diverted can only be assessed through a more
detailed inspection which occurs only if it is subsequently deemed appropriate by the prosecutor
in charge of the municipality. County mayors are given the possibility to comment on the draft
report within ￿ve business days. Auditors in turn explain whether or not they accept the mayor’s
justi￿cation of problems found.
2.2 The role of the judiciary as a check on local executive power
Final audit reports are sent to local legislatures, the federal ministries which are remitting the trans-
fers, external audit institutions at state and federal levels, as well as state and federal prosecutors.
Prosecutors then decide whether to further investigate the irregularities uncovered by auditors and
whether and what charges to press against particular individuals. Administrative misconduct is
prosecuted at the local level, while prosecution of corruption falls into the jurisdiction of the state
attorney general and judgment is passed by the state court of justice.
23Exceptions to this rule are possible if warranted by the program under inspection.
9If convicted of corruption, defendants may be imprisoned for 1 to 8 years, in addition to losing
their mandate and incurring ￿nes. If convicted of "acts of administrative misconduct" or "impro-
bity", punishments include the loss of mandate, the suspension of political rights for 8 to 10 years,
prohibition from entering into public contracts for 10 years as well as the obligation to reimburse
public coffers. In addition to charging individuals with corruption or administrative improbity,
prosecutors have the privilege to use civil requests, requiring the entity in question to change its
practice or be ￿ned and prosecuted.24 Because the judiciary cannot initiate proceedings on its own,
prosecutors play a key role in the criminal justice system.25
In Brazil, prosecutors and judges are not part of local governments but of the state government
and they are granted substantial de iure and de facto independence. The 1988 Constitution stipu-
lates that individual prosecutors cannot be ￿red and guarantees their salaries. Prosecutors are hired
by public examination which are highly competitive. At the state level, the only formal politi-
cal in￿uence occurs through the appointment of the attorney-general by the state governor from a
short-list of three candidates who are members of the state procuracy.
3 Data
3.1 Data on irregularities in local public management
Having described some key features of the Brazilian control system, we now present our measures
of rent extraction in local governments in more detail. Audit report ￿ndings were compiled into
a database by a team of researchers directed by Francisco Ramos at the federal university of Per-
nambuco. Our empirical analysis is based on a sample of 1064 counties (about 20% of all counties
in 2000) that have been audited through June 2006.26 Following the practice of the comptroller
general’s of￿ce, we refer to the reported infractions of public sector management regulations as
irregularities in public administration. It is worth emphasizing that each reported irregularity con-
stitutes a breach of a speci￿c legal norm by a local of￿cial and is potentially subject to prosecution
24See Arantes (2004) on the organization and legal instruments at the disposal of the Brazilian "Ministerio Publico".
25Prosecutors do not have the monopoly to charge individuals with corruption or administrative improbity as Art. 5 of the
Brazilian constitution gives that right to ordinary citizens as well. Citizens rarely press charges, however. In addition, legis-
latures have the right to hold the executive accountable through impeachment proceedings. This channel of accountability
depends entirely on the power con￿guration inside the legislature.
26The number of municipal audits carried out through round 21 is 1091. 21 municipalities were audited twice, and for 6
municipalities we lack census characteristics because they were installed after the year 2000.
10by state procuracies.27
The violations reported by auditors range from improper ￿nancial reporting, over lack of over-
sight in project implementation, to waste and actual theft of public resources. The following
quotes, translated from actual audit reports, illustrate the types of irregularities encountered by
auditors.
1) We verify the existence of improper payments to administrative staff at the expense
of service personnel in the healthcare center. This situation is contrary to health ministry
regulation which explicitly prohibits the use of federal transfers to this end.28
2) The mayor’s of￿ce failed to organize a competitive tender for the procurement of
school textbooks under the pretext that these books were unique although equivalent
alternative textbooks were in fact available. The same administration had purchased
different textbooks in the past.29
3) Our inspection of the project execution for two sanitary units reveals that they were
constructed in smaller dimensions than projected. We also found that the height of the
ceramic masonry in the bathroom was constructed below project speci￿cations.30
Most of the irregularities uncovered by auditors are not easily classi￿ed as corrupt practices,
in the sense of indicating abuse of public of￿ce for private (material) gain, although they very
often do re￿ect bad public management practices. Indeed, none of the examples above appear to
unambiguously involve corruption. In all examples, however, managers were not exerting enough
effort on their job, that is, they were shirking or circumventing regulations that are intended to
bene￿t end-users of public services. They circumvented procurement procedures that are privately
costly to carry out, diverted public funds from their intended use and failed to oversee project
implementation by contractors, which led to sub-standard project execution.
While distinguishing corruption from bad management is very dif￿cult in practice￿even for
prosecutors￿,31 it is also clearly the case that not all irregularities are equally serious. In line
27Not all irregularities reported by auditors are under the control of local of￿cials. We exclude those (few) instances from
our measures where auditors report on state or federal government failures or where reported irregularities are otherwise
beyond local government control.
289th lottery, Salgado de Sªo FØlix municipality, Para￿ba state, Primary and Preventive Health Care Program.
2911th lottery, Abaetetuba municipality, ParÆ state, Programa Brasil Alfabetizado.
3010th lottery, Farias Brito municipality, CearÆ state, Programa Esporte SolidÆrio.
31Other existing objective measures typically capture corruption together with more general forms of government inef-
￿ciency. This issue is most pronounced with unit cost measures (Golden and Picci 2005) and input prices for hospital
supplies (Di Tella and Schargrodski 2003). It also seems likely that at least part of the difference between funds disbursed
by the central government and funds reported by recipients (schools) re￿ects management quality, i.e. adequate book-
11with CGU headquarter guidelines, we distinguish practices that indicate waste or corruption in
the local provision of public services, which we label management irregularities, from practices
where the connection to inef￿ciency is only indirect, such as irregular or non-existent ￿nancial
reports, which we refer to as procedural irregularities. The distinction between management and
procedural irregularities is also important as a robustness check on our results because local of￿cial
are a priori less likely to get punished for procedural irregularities and hence judicial presence
should matter less for the incidence of these practices, if at all.
Appendix I gives a detailed description of the incidence of various kinds of irregularities and
whether we consider them of the management or procedural type. We also indicate the types of
irregularities we think could be reasonably classi￿ed either way. In the examples above, 1) would
be a diversion of project resources, which we classify as a management irregularity. 2) would be
an inappropriate procurement modality, which we think could be classi￿ed as either a management
or a procedural irregularity. 3) would be an example of substandard project execution, which we
deem a management irregularity.
An important challenge for any measure of rents is how to deal with issues of scale and potential
reporting bias. The raw reported number of irregularities is a problematic measure of rents because
it mechanically increases with local government size (more locally administered programs, more
scope for irregularities) and with the number of inspections that are carried out (more inspections,
more reported irregularities). Moreover, there will be measurement error bias to the extent that the
regressor of interest (judicial presence in our case) is correlated with local government size or the
number of inspections. In order to address these issues, we construct a unique dataset at the level
of the inspection order by obtaining those inspections from the audit reports which turned up no
irregularities at all, and by relating each irregularity to its corresponding service order.32
Another key feature of our micro-data is that is allows us to separately examine the extensive
margin of rent extraction (share of inspections with at least one irregularity) and the intensive
margin (number of irregularities per inspections with at least one irregularity). This decomposition
keeping, rather than corruption (Reinikka and Svensson, 2004). Similarly, at least part of the difference between reported
expenditure on road construction and estimated actual expenditure may be due to project management, i.e. attention to
materials lost in the construction process, rather than corruption (Olken 2007).
32There could still remain some measurement error bias if auditors in the ￿eld spent disproportionate amounts of time or
effort in counties with judicial presence or if the CGU headquarters exercised discretion in the inspection orders issued to
state CGU branches.
12is important because it allows us to distinguish a situation in which there are irregularities in most
or all inspections from a situation in which many irregularities are concentrated in just a few
inspections. The decomposition also allows us to test not just whether but how judicial presence
(or any other institution or policy) affects rent extraction by the local executive branch.
From a descriptive standpoint, the distinction between extensive and intensive margins of rent
extraction matters a great deal. Table 1 presents the distribution of irregularities per inspection
(technically per service order). The ￿rst striking ￿nding is that 35 percent of all inspections in
the sample came up entirely clean, while the median is one irregularity per inspection. This is in
stark contrast with the mean number of irregularities per inspection (not shown) which is about 2.
The mean is more than twice the median because of many irregularities in just a few inspections:
10% of inspections turn up six or more irregularities. Table 1 also gives summary statistics broken
down by type of irregularity for two de￿nitions of management vs. procedural irregularities (see
AppendixIforthetypesofirregularitieswethinkcouldbereasonablyclassi￿edeitherway). Under
our two de￿nitions of management irregularities, 55 percent and 61 percent of all inspections,
respectively, came up clean, that is, without direct evidence that public resources were wasted or
stolen. Again, the average of management irregularities per inspection is about 1 (not shown),
the median is zero, and the difference is largely driven by two and one percent of inspections,
respectively, which turned up six or more management irregularities.
Table 2 presents summary statistics for the extensive and intensive margins of rent extraction
and the number of irregularities per inspection (the product of extensive and intensive margins),
aggregated by municipality. The average of total irregularities divided by total inspections across
municipalities in our data is 2.2 (median 1.9), while the mean (and median) share of inspections
that turn up at least one irregularity is 67%, and the mean number of irregularities per inspections
with at least one irregularity is 3.2 (median 2.8). This means that in the "typical" municipality a
full 33% of inspections came up entirely clean. Looking only at irregularities that indicate waste
or corruption, the average total of such irregularities per total inspections is about 1 (median 0.8),
while the mean (and median) share of inspections involving such irregularities is about 0.45, and
the conditional-on-positive mean number of such irregularities per inspections is 2.1 (median 1.9).
That is, in the typical municipality, 55% of all inspections give no indication that public resources
13were wasted. This number increases to about 65% when we drop irregularities that we consider
could be classi￿ed as either of the management or of the procedural type.
3.2 Caveats
There are three caveats worth pointing out regarding our measures of rent extraction. First, we
assume that existing rules and regulations which de￿ne both management and procedural irregu-
larities make sense, that is, they serve a legitimate purpose in a reasonable way.33 Put differently,
we take irregularities to be generally detrimental to public service delivery, rather than re￿ecting
attempts by well-meaning of￿cials to circumvent inef￿cient red tape. As mentioned above, mayors
andmanagershavethepossibilitytocommentontheauditreport. Sometimesauditorsconcedethat
there are valid arguments for non-compliance and we exclude these instances from our measures.
Based on our reading of the regulations considered here, we believe that reported irregularities
are for the most part undesirable from a social point of view because they either involve a direct
waste or loss of public resources or complicate the detection of such mismanagement. It is also
worth noting that the regulations pertaining to public ￿nancial management re￿ect international
best practices.34
The second caveat is that we need to assume that auditors themselves were not bribed into
manipulating audit ￿ndings (Mookherjee and Png, 1995). If this manipulation were for some
reason more likely in municipalities with judicial presence, it would bias our estimates. However,
webelievethattheinstitutionalsetupmakesitveryunlikelythatauditorsarecorrupt. First, auditors
are paid by the federal government, not by local governments, which makes it less likely that they
are captured by local special interests. Second, auditors work in teams of about 10 people on
average. This makes it hard to sustain collusion on any signi￿cant scale because the whole team
has to be bribed in order to conceal irregularities. Third, the interaction between auditors and local
of￿cials is at a single point in time (unknown ex ante), which again makes it harder to sustain
collusion.
The third caveat is that even if auditors were incorruptible, the local elite might somehow man-
age to manipulate what gets uncovered and what remains unnoticed. While this scenario is plausi-
33Without this assumption we are still evaluating compliance.
34See PEFA (2006) for an overview of international standards in public ￿nancial management.
14ble in general, it is unlikely in our case because local elites play no direct role in carrying out the
audit. Auditors go into a county with speci￿c orders to investigate particular programs and projects
and the items on their list are not subject to local review. Neither is it likely that local managers
succeed in systematically concealing irregular transactions such that auditors fail to uncover them
since the audit is very thorough, involving both ￿nancial auditing and detailed inspection of public
works and services.
3.3 Data on county characteristics
Data on county characteristics are obtained from several sources. Data on judiciary districts and
the indicator for local judicial presence were obtained from each state’s law on the organization
and territorial division of the judiciary branch (C￿digo da Organiza￿ªo e Divisªo JudiciÆria). For
most states, the data on judiciary districts and local judicial presence is from the year 2005. To
construct our instrument, we therefore rank municipalities within each judiciary district in terms
of year 2005 population. Information on local judicial presence in 1999 is from a nation-wide
survey entitled ￿Per￿l dos Munic￿pios Brasileiros: Gestªo Pœblica￿, conducted by the Instituto
Brasileiro de Geogra￿a e Estat￿stica (IBGE). Of￿cial local population data for the years 2000 and
2005 are also from IBGE.35 Data on local income distribution, schooling and health outcomes,
and distance to state capitals are from the Instituto de Pesquisa Economica Aplicada (IPEA) based
on the 2000 census. Mayor characteristics and political participation data are from the Tribunal
Superior Eleitoral (TSE).
Table 3 presents sample means of the covariates used in the empirical analysis. Column 1
gives sample means of all 4442 municipalities in Brazil for which we do not have audits data.
Columns 2 through 4 give sample means for mutually exclusive subsamples of municipalities for
which we have audits data available. Column 2 gives sample means for the 275 single-county
judiciary districts in our dataset, column 3 for the 304 municipalities with judicial presence in
multi-county districts and column 4 for the 485 municipalities without judicial presence. Columns
5 and 6 present summary statistics for our main estimation sample: multi-county districts with
35Forintercensalyears, suchas2005, of￿cialpopulationestimatesareproducedusingaforecastingprocedurethatensures
consistency of estimates for lower level units (municipalities) with the higher levels (states and the country as a whole)
(IBGE, 2002).
15and without judicial presence that were no larger than 40’000 inhabitants according to year 2000
census ￿gures. Counties with and without judicial presence show sizeable differences in the raw
sample means for many municipality characteristics, making it clear that controlling for population
is crucial for our approach.
4 Background on judiciary districts, identi￿cation and estimation
4.1 Background on judiciary districts
We are interested in estimating the causal effect of judicial presence on rent extraction in local gov-
ernments. The main empirical challenge is that state judiciary of￿cials might choose the location
of the local judiciary seat at least partly in response to local conditions.36 We address potential
endogeneity of local judicial presence by exploiting an institutional feature of state judiciary sys-
tems in Brazil: although state judiciary branches provide services to all counties in a given state,
only those counties that are suf￿ciently large in terms of observable characteristics may become a
judiciary district (comarca in Portuguese) by themselves and get a physical presence of judges and
prosecutors.37 State-speci￿c laws specify necessary￿although not suf￿cient￿conditions for the
creation of judiciary districts in terms of population size and typically a subset of other character-
istics, such as geographical area, size of the electorate, county ￿scal revenue and judicial caseload.
Roughly 75% of all counties do not become their own judiciary district.38 These counties are
grouped together with contiguous neighbors by the judiciary, and only one of them becomes the
local judiciary seat (sede da comarca) and gets the physical presence of prosecutors and judges.
Table 4 summarizes the territorial organization of the judiciary across Brazilian states at two
points in time, 1999 and 2005. The table shows that there are slightly more than two counties
per judiciary district on average. Because of a substantial number of single-county districts, the
average district size for districts that group more than one county together is about three. The table
also shows that the number of judiciary districts in Brazil has increased only little over the course
of these seven years. Although not shown in the table, the vast majority (95%) of counties that had
36This is what Becker’s (1968) model of crime and punishment would suggest. In addition to reverse causality, omitted
variable bias is also likely. See Eide (1998) for a review of the empirical literature on the economics of crime.
37Lei Complementar No 35, de 14 de Mar￿o de 1979, Art. 95-97.
38The vast majority of single-county judiciary districts meet the state-speci￿c requirements even though exceptions￿
determined at the discretion of the judiciary￿are explicitly allowed by law (Lei Complementar No 35, de 14 de Mar￿o de
1979, Art. 97, 2nd paragraph).
16a local judicial presence in 1999 also had it in 2005 (and vice versa), making judicial presence a
permanent feature of the local institutional environment.
4.2 Identi￿cation
Although state laws typically do not specify which of the contiguous counties forming a multi-
county judiciary district gets the physical presence of prosecutors and judges, the internally used
assignment rule is to locate the judiciary seat in the most populous county. Our research design
exploits this rule by using an indicator for judiciary-district-speci￿c maximum population as an
instrument for local judicial presence. Note that this research design is necessarily silent on the
causal effect of judicial presence for single-county districts since we lack information about the
assignment rule in these cases.
Essentially, our reduced form compares counties that are largest in their district to counties
with identical population size from other districts in the same state, where they are not the most
populous. Our instrumental variable approach relies on three main assumptions to identify the
causal effect of judicial presence on rent extraction in local governments. First, conditional on
population, district maximum population is mean independent of unobserved factors that affect
outcomes (conditional independence). Second, district maximum population affects rent extraction
only through local judicial presence, not through other channels (exclusion restriction). Third, the
probability of having a judiciary presence in the municipality jumps when the municipality is
largest within its district, conditional on population (￿rst stage).
More formally, let Y denote the outcome variable (share of inspections with at least one ir-
regularity), D treatment status (one for judicial presence, 0 otherwise), Z the instrument (one for
judiciary-district-speci￿c maximum population, zero otherwise), X municipality population, U
unobservables that affect Y and V unobservables that affect D. Assuming that the treatment effect
is constant, we can write the outcome and ￿rst stage equations as follows:
Y D ￿DD C ￿XX C ￿ZZ C U
D D ￿ ZZ C ￿ XX C V
Note that assuming linear speci￿cations for X in the outcome and ￿rst state equations is without
17loss of generality as one could always include polynomial terms in X to ￿exibly control for pop-
ulation.39 Correlation between U and V (common factors determining both judicial presence and
outcomes) leads to a correlation between D and U and hence endogeneity of D, even conditional
on X. As a result, multiple regression and matching estimators will lead to inconsistent estimates
under this data generating process.
Instead, our instrumental variable approach explicitly allows for a correlation between U and V
since it only uses variation in D induced by Z to estimate ￿D. Under the conditional independence
assumption, district maximum population is mean independent of U and V, conditional on popu-
lation: E.UjZ; X/ D E.UjX/ and E.VjZ; X/ D E.VjX/. And under the exclusion restriction
￿Z D 0: Together with the ￿rst stage assumption, ￿ Z > 0, it can easily be shown that the ratio of
reduced form coef￿cients on Z identi￿es ￿D:
E.YjZ D 1; X/ ￿ E.YjZ D 0; X/





In what follows, we assess the plausibility of the three main identifying assumptions that lead to
this result.
4.3 Assessing conditional mean independence
The key threat to the conditional independence assumption is that unobserved factors are correlated
with population rank and that they also have an effect on outcomes, even conditional on popula-
tion. Note that both of these conditions must hold for conditional mean independence to fail. For
example, a second-ranked municipality is by construction part of a larger district than a top-ranked
municipality, once we compare municipalities of the same population size, and so population rank
is mechanically correlated with district population. But conditional mean independence only fails
if district size also has a direct effect on outcomes, conditional on population.
More formally, let W denote district size, ￿W the effect of W on Y, and U0 other unob-
served factors that affect outcomes so that we can write E.UjZ; X/ D E.￿WW C U0jZ; X/ D
39See Stock and Watson (2007), Appendix 13.3, for a textbook discussion of conditional mean independence.
40To see this, substitute the equation for D into the equation for Y and evaluate the conditional expectations on the left-
hand sided of equation (1). For example, we have E.YjZ D 1; X D x/ D .￿D￿ Z C ￿Z/ C .￿D￿ X C ￿X/x C E.￿DV C
UjZ D 1; X D x/ D ￿D￿ Z C .￿D￿ X C ￿X/x C ￿DE.VjX D x/ C E.UjX D x/, where the second equality follows
from the exclusion restriction and the conditional mean independence of Z given X. Proceeding analogously with the other
three conditional expectations produces the right-hand side of equation (1).
18￿W E.WjZ; X/ C E.U0jZ; X/. Even if E.WjZ; X/ 6D E.WjX/; conditional mean independence
will hold as long as ￿W t 0 and E.U0jZ; X/ D E.U0jX/. Empirically, it turns out that the ef-
fect of district size on outcomes, ￿W, is indeed close to zero, once we control for municipality
population. The more general point, however, is that a correlation between unobserved factors and
population rank by itself does not invalidate the conditional independence assumption, as long as
these factors do not affect outcomes, conditional on population. Consequently, there is no point in
showing estimates of the correlation between W and Z, conditional on X (and estimates of ￿W)
separately, although these results are available on request.
Instead, we show in Section 5 below that￿conditional on population￿our estimates of ￿D are
very robust to the inclusion of standard potential confounders such as income per capita and the
poverty rate, average education of the local population (Glaeser and Saks, 2006), ease of access
to information (Reinikka and Svensson, 2005), proxied by the presence of a local radio station
and internet access, and voter turnout (Zingales, 2004). We also prove our results robust to the
inclusion of mayor party af￿liation indicators and other mayor characteristics, such as incumbency
status, education level, age, and gender as in Ferraz and Finan (2010). Another possibility we
consider is that second-ranked municipalities might be geographically closer to their respective
state capitals, and proximity itself might be related to outcomes through agglomeration effects
for example. While empirically it is indeed true that second-ranked municipalities are closer to
state capitals, distance to the state capital turns out not to affect rent-extraction, conditional on
population.
In addition to these standard controls we also test for confounding factors that might be speci￿c
to our research design. For example, as noted above, state laws specify necessary conditions for the
creation of judiciary districts in terms of observable characteristics such as geographical area, size
of the electorate and county ￿scal revenue, in addition to population.41 Top-ranked municipalities
might be systematically different along some or all of these dimensions and these characteristics
might be correlated with rent extraction even conditional on population. It turns out however, that
none of these potential confounders affect our results once we control for population (estimates
available on request).
41Judicial caseload is another criterion that is sometimes used but we do not have this data.
19Another potential concern is that the legislation in each state only speci￿es necessary, not suf-
￿cient, conditions for the creation of judiciary districts. This means that there are municipalities
that would qualify on their own to have a judicial presence, yet they are grouped together with
other municipalities they share a border with. If￿for some reason￿ful￿lling all the necessary
conditions for district creation were correlated with population rank and if qualifying had an effect
on outcomes, conditional on population, conditional mean independence would fail. It turns out,
however, that neither of these conditions is satis￿ed (results are available on request).
Of course there might be other unobserved factors that are correlated with population rank
and that also have an effect on outcomes, even conditional on population. For example, better
managed counties might successfully pressure the judiciary to be grouped into judiciary districts
with smaller neighbors, making the top-ranked counties systematically better managed than lower-
ranked counties in other districts, even conditional on population. While we cannot rule out this
possibility, it is reassuring that our estimates are essentially unchanged with the inclusion of the
long list of observables discussed above, once we condition on population.
4.4 Assessing the exclusion restriction
In addition to being independent of unobservables, conditional on population, being the largest
county in the district should affect rent extraction only through local judicial presence, not through
other channels. To our knowledge, the territorial organization in terms of districts is an institutional
feature of state judiciary systems only￿unique and distinct from the territorial organization of
local and state governments, for example. Note that other public or private institutions might
of course use the same travel cost minimization logic to allocate headquarters among a set of
contiguous counties as the one used for determining judicial presence. But there is no intrinsic
reason for other institutions to rank municipalities in terms of population within judiciary districts,
unless of course these institutions are related to the functioning of the judiciary.
So what if other institutions, such as state or federal police, also used population rank within
each district to determine whether or not to establish a local presence? We do not have data
on police presence at the local level to evaluate this channel.42 Note, however, that as long as
42If required, we could of course attempt to get this data.
20state or federal police presence is a direct consequence of judicial presence￿because enforcement
activities in the local public sector are complementary with judicial presence￿police presence
would not violate the exclusion restriction. It would simply mean that one of the channels through
which judicial presence operates is through the presence of state or federal police.
In addition to the arguments above, our research design allows us to assess the validity of the
exclusion restriction empirically, using a placebo test. If top population rank within the district
had no direct effect on outcomes per se, conditional on population, it seems natural to expect
no difference between second-ranked and lower-ranked municipalities either. The placebo test
we perform therefore compares our measures of rent extraction between municipalities that are
second-ranked in their district and those that are lower-ranked, conditional on population. As
shown in Section 5 below, we ￿nd no effect of this placebo treatment, suggesting that population
rank per se does not matter for rent extraction. As a result, it seems likely that the exclusion
restriction holds, once we control for population.
4.5 Assessing the ￿rst stage
Finally, the ￿rst stage assumption requires that the probability of having a judiciary presence in the
municipality jumps when the municipality is largest within its district, conditional on population.
We show below that, controlling for population and other covariates, the ￿rst stage estimate is
about 73 percentage points and highly signi￿cant.
If the effect of local judicial presence on rent extraction is heterogeneous, we estimate a local
average treatment effect for small- to medium-sized municipalities in multi-county districts.43 This
average effect excludes those municipalities which￿perhaps for political reasons￿get a judicial
presence irrespective of population rank, as well as those which do not get a judicial presence,
irrespective of population rank.44 Because the subpopulation of complier municipalities (for which
district-speci￿c population rank determines judicial presence) represents a sizeable share of all
municipalities in Brazil￿as indicated by the ￿rst stage of 73 percentage points￿the estimated
local effect might be fairly representative of the average effect among small- to medium-sized
43Abadie (2003) shows that if P.Z D 1jX/ is linear in X (and if appropriate regularity conditions hold), then the IV
estimand with covariates provides a MMSE approximation to the average causal response for compliers.
44This result requires the monotonicity assumption, which in our case says that municipalities that got a judicial presence
when they were not largest in their district, would have also gotten judicial presence had they been the most populous
(Angrist and Imbens 1994; Angrist and Pischke 2009).
21municipalities.
4.6 Estimation approach
We use the IV estimator to estimate ￿D (rather than indirect least squares (ILS) as in the discussion
above)becauseinadditiontoprovidingapointestimate(numericallyidenticaltotheILSestimate),
the IV estimator also directly calculates the correct (robust) standard errors.45 Because the popu-
lation size of the municipality has a direct effect on rent extraction, conditioning on population is
crucial for our approach. Figure 1 shows that there are essentially no municipalities ranked second
or lower in terms of population in their district (Z=0) that have a population above 40’000 in our
sample. In order to ensure a common support we therefore drop treatment group municipalities
(Z=1) with population above 40’000 from the sample.46 We also drop single-county judiciary dis-
tricts, which satisfy all requirements by themselves and are therefore intrinsically different from
those that do not.47 Note that these two sample restrictions are dictated by our knowledge of
the assignment rule for multi-county judiciary districts and the fact that we lack such institutional
information about single-county judiciary districts.
We control for the direct effect of population on outcomes using polynomial terms in actual year
2000 census population.48 We use year 2000 census population as a control￿rather than predicted
2005 population￿in order to be consistent with the measurement of other municipality character-
istics which are all from the year 2000.49 All estimations below include state ￿xed effects because
the probability of having a local judicial presence varies systematically across states (as evident
from Table 4) as does our measure of rent extraction. Note that we cannot include judiciary district
￿xed effects since our research design necessarily compares counties from different districts once
population is held constant.
45Reduced form estimates are available on request.
46We only trim from the top because at the bottom the two supports overlap as is evident from Figure 1.
47Conceptually, our instrument is also not well de￿ned in single-county judiciary districts because maximum population
requires a comparison of at least two municipalities per district.
48Results are quantitatively very similar when we use a set of indicators for bins of X as controls.
49Results are quantitatively very similar when we use year 2005 predicted population as a control.
225 Estimation results
Table 5 presents linear probability model (OLS) estimates of the ￿rst stage relationship between
local judicial presence (judiciary seat) and the indicator for judiciary-district-speci￿c maximum
population(maximumpopulation), conditionalonpopulation. Theestimatesof￿ Z inthe￿rstthree
columns of Table 5 with linear, quadratic, and cubic population controls, respectively, suggest that
the probability of having a local presence of the judicial apparatus increases by a highly signi￿cant
80 percentage points if the county is largest in its district, for counties with the same population
size. Columnsfour, ￿veandsixconsecutivelyaddmunicipalitycharacteristics, asetofmayorparty
af￿liation dummies, and other mayor characteristics. Municipality characteristics are the only set
of covariates that jointly predict judicial presence (p-value=0.00) and some of these seem to be
somewhat correlated with the instrument since the point estimates of ￿ Z decreases to about 73
percentage points. The last two columns of Table 5 show that the ￿rst stage is similar in magnitude
and statistical signi￿cance, irrespective of whether the municipality is run by a ￿rst- or second-
term mayor. Overall, these results suggest that, controlling for population and other covariates, the
￿rst stage estimate is about 73 percentage points.
Table 6 gives IV estimates of ￿D using the share of inspections that turn up at least one irregu-
larity as the dependent variable. The point estimates of ￿D in the ￿rst three columns of Table 6 are
decreasing from the linear population control to the quadratic and then stabilize (no change when
the cubic control term is added) at ￿0:051, signi￿cant at the 5 percent level. This suggests that
while the linear speci￿cation of population yields an upward biased estimate of ￿D, the quadratic
and cubic speci￿cations control for any direct effect of population size on the incidence of irreg-
ularities. Columns four through eight show that, consistent with the assumption of independence
of the instrument conditional on population, the effect size of about ￿0:05 is remarkably robust
to the inclusion of municipality characteristics, mayor party af￿liation dummies, as well as other
mayor characteristics. While these tests of the conditional independence assumption are reassur-
ing, one should keep in mind that much of the variation in the share of irregular inspections remains
unaccounted for even after controlling for all available covariates (R-squared only reaches about
0.24).
23Table 7 presents the main empirical result, which is that local presence of state judicial in-
stitutions reduces the share of inspections with irregularities related to waste or corruption (the
extensive margin of rent extraction) by about 10 percent or 0.3 standard deviations. As in Table 6,
the IV estimate of ￿D in the ￿rst three columns of Table 7 decreases as the quadratic population
term is added but stabilizes at about ￿0:046, again signi￿cant at the 5 percent level. And again, the
effect size is remarkably robust to the inclusion of municipality characteristics, mayor party af￿li-
ation dummies, as well as other mayor characteristics. Compared to the mean share of inspections
with management irregularities of 0.44 and standard deviation of 0.16, the effect amounts to about
￿10% or 0:3 standard deviations.
In contrast, there is no evidence of an effect when we use as dependent variables the total num-
ber of irregularities divided by either the number of inspections with at least one irregularity (the
intensive margin) or by the number of total inspections (the product of extensive and intensive mar-
gins). Table 8 shows results for total irregularities divided by the number of "dirty" inspections.
The point estimates change sign several times across speci￿cations and they are nowhere near sta-
tistical signi￿cance, mainly because the standard errors are an order of magnitude larger compared
to Tables 6 and 7 above. We omit the results for total irregularities divided by total inspections to
save space (they are available on request).
Table 9 shows that the lower incidence of infractions is driven exclusively by a reduction in
management irregularities, rather than procedural irregularities. This result is consistent with the
intuition that less serious infractions are less likely to be detected by the public and prosecuted
by the judiciary. The result also suggests that the reduction in management irregularities is un-
likely to be driven by a better understanding of public management regulations and hence better
compliance in counties with local judicial presence, since this would presumably affect procedural
irregularities more than irregularities indicating waste or corruption.
Table 10 shows that the results are robust to an alternative cutoff values for trimming the pop-
ulation support. The cutoff value above 51’000 residents is chosen because this includes the next
two municipalities which are second- or lower-ranked in their district, as evident from Figure 1.
While the choice of cutoff value is clearly arbitrary, we have found quantitatively similar results
for a range of cutoffs and these results are available on request. Tables 11 and 12 show that the
24results are also robust to an alternative de￿nition of mismanagement vs. procedural irregularities.
The placebo test in Table 13 shows that the incidence of irregularities is no different between
municipalities that are second-ranked in their district and those that are lower-ranked, conditional
on population. Although most of the estimates are negative, they are an order of magnitude smaller
than the estimates of ￿D discussed above and they are nowhere near statistical signi￿cance. The
placebo test result therefore increases our con￿dence in the exclusion restriction, that is, were it
not through judicial presence, population rank per se would have no effect on rent extraction.
In Tables 14 and 15 we test whether the effect of local presence of the judiciary on rent ex-
traction depends on the mayor’s re-election incentives. Our estimates suggest that judicial and
political accountability complement each other, with judicial presence reducing the share of in-
spections with irregularities more strongly for ￿rst-term mayors compared to second-term mayors.
In fact, for mayors in their second term, local judicial presence does not seem to matter at all. The
estimate of the differential effect in Table 14 becomes a bit larger and statistically signi￿cant at 5
percent when covariates are added.50
Table 15 shows that the differential effect is again driven by a reduction in irregularities re-
lated to waste or corruption. For mayors in their ￿rst term, the point estimate is about ￿0:07
(sum of the ￿rst two coef￿cients), or roughly ￿16%, signi￿cant at 5% throughout (p-value on
F-statistic). For mayors in their second term in contrast, local judicial presence seems to have no
effect. These results suggest that judicial presence operates mostly through an increased probabil-
ity of detection of irregularities, which disciplines incumbents with re-election incentives, rather
thananincreasedprobabilityofprosecutionorconviction, whichshouldalsodisciplineincumbents
without re-election incentives. This interpretation is consistent with the fact that actual convictions
of majors and other local of￿cials are very rare events in Brazil (Arantes, 2004).
6 Conclusion
Our paper provides the ￿rst evidence on the role of the judiciary in constraining executive power
based on micro-data, focusing on rent extraction by the executive branch. In particular, we show
50We ￿nd quantitatively similar results when we restrict the sample to municipalities that were audited during 2003 or
2004, the last two years of the 2001-2004 term, to which our ￿rst-term indicator corresponds. Since auditors inspect
transfers that were made during the two to three preceding years, audit results from 2005 and 2006 correspond at least in
part to management practices in the 2001-2004 term.
25that local presence of state judicial institutions in Brazil reduces the share of inspections with
irregularities related to waste or corruption by about 10 percent or 0.3 standard deviations. In
addition, we provide new evidence on the interaction between electoral and judicial accountability.
In particular, our estimates suggest that judicial presence reduces rent extraction only when mayors
have re-election incentives. This might indicate that judicial presence operates mostly through an
increased probability of detection, which disciplines incumbents with re-election incentives, rather
thananincreasedprobabilityofprosecutionorconviction, whichshouldalsodisciplineincumbents
without re-election incentives.
Although this evidence is suggestive of a particular mechanism, ultimately we cannot say pre-
cisely how judicial presence leads to a reduction in rent extraction by local government of￿cials.
The results are nonetheless of interest from the perspective of evaluating whether to scale up judi-
cialpresenceatthelocallevel, sincepinpointingexactchannelsistypicallynotviewedasnecessary
(nor suf￿cient) for such an exercise (Ludwig, Kling and Mullainathan, 2011).51 Given that about
75% of all municipalities belong to multi-county districts and that the vast majority of them is of
small to medium size, and given the high proportion of municipalities that followed the assignment
rule, the (local average) treatment effect we identify in this study is in fact fairly general. From a
policy perspective, our results therefore suggest that scaling up judicial presence at the local level
in Brazil would likely reduce irregularities related to waste or corruption in the local public sector.
Judicial presence should be scaled up if and only if the net bene￿ts of such a policy are positive.
While the costs of an expansion of judicial presence are relatively easy to quantify, assessing the
bene￿ts in monetary terms is dif￿cult as we would need to know the value of a marginal increase
in compliance with existing public sector rules and regulations (and other bene￿ts of local judicial
presence). A necessary ￿rst step in this direction would be to quantify the cost savings and ideally
even service delivery improvements stemming from judicial presence. Unfortunately, however, the
audit reports considered here do not systematically include an estimated amount of funds that were
diverted, wasted or stolen. More detailed data is therefore required to better quantify the bene￿ts
of local judicial presence in terms of cost savings and service improvements.
Whether judicial presence reduces rent extraction in other countries and institutional contexts
51Learning more about mechanisms would of course be desirable in itself in order to interpret the results and to help
assess whether they would generalize to other settings (Deaton, 2010; Ludwig, Kling and Mullainathan, 2011).
26as well is an open and important question. We speculate, however, that our results help explain
the fact that state district attorneys, the U.S. institutional equivalent of Brazilian state prosecutors,
today are present in every county in the U.S., although historically this was not the case. Since
budget constraints often require that a choice has to be made where to place the judicial apparatus,
similar research designs to the one introduced in this paper might be applicable to historical U.S.
data or to contemporary data from developing countries other than Brazil.
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318 Appendix I
Incidence and classification of irregularities
                                  % Classification
Civil society oversight of government programs 4.97
-  non-existent civil society council 10.32        Procedural
- ineffective/non-existent oversight 70.93        Procedural
- irregular council composition of oversight council   9.94        Procedural
- evidence of council capture by mayor   1.33        Procedural
-  no meeting records   0.35        Procedural
-  formal errors   7.13        Procedural
Quality and timeliness of financial reporting 12.88
-  irregular/non-existent financial report 66.34          Procedural
-  irregular/non-existent receipts 29.04          Procedural
- delayed reporting   4.62        Procedural
Financial program and project management   3.58
- emission of checks without justification   7.88 Mgmt./Proc.
- excess cash holdings (opportunity cost) 43.71 Mgmt./Proc.
-  unjustified payment of bank fees   1.40        Mgmt./Proc.
- irregular account management 36.57        Procedural
-  spending without appropriation   4.51        Procedural
-  failure to return residual project funds   5.39        Procedural
-  premature withdrawal of funds   0.53        Procedural
Procurement for programs and projects 15.01
-  simulated tender process   3.05        Management
- evidence of favoritism   4.11        Management
-  non-selection of the lowest bid   2.07        Management
-  evidence of price collusion   0.62          Mgmt./Proc.
-  inappropriate procurement modality (less competition)   4.60          Mgmt./Proc.
-  unjustified procurement modality   7.50          Mgmt./Proc.
-  irregular composition/capture of the procurement commission   1.90          Mgmt./Proc.
-  invitation for bids to less than three firms   7.79          Mgmt./Proc.
-  participating ineligible firm   9.12          Mgmt./Proc.
-  fractionalizing of procurement amounts   4.11          Mgmt./Proc.
- absence of preliminary price survey   6.58          Procedural
-  inadequate publication of the call   4.38          Procedural
-  incomplete specification of the call   3.90          Procedural
-  inadequate publication of results   2.05          Procedural
-  tender process without funding   0.07          Procedural
-  formal errors 35.61          Procedural
Contribution collection   1.74          Procedural
32Execution of programs and capital projects 36.54
-  unjustified or excessive payments for goods and services   7.82        Management
-  project not implemented   9.29        Management
-  partial project execution   4.78        Management
-  substandard project execution 26.01          Management
-  inadequate project inputs   1.70        Management
-  diversion of project resources   9.68        Management
-  time overruns   0.49        Mgmt./Proc.
-  project delays   2.00        Mgmt./Proc.
-  project on hold   1.05        Mgmt./Proc.
- inadequate infrastructure to run program   5.29        Procedural
-  lacking oversight of project implementation   5.72        Procedural
-  irregular sub-contracting 0.12        Procedural
-  irregular change of work plan   2.03        Procedural
-  irregular project documentation 12.05 Procedural
-  matching grant requirements are not met by local governments   3.26 Procedural
- staff members have inadequate training   3.75        Procedural
-  irregular contract   0.47        Procedural
-  late payment to suppliers   0.14        Procedural
-  failure to notify community of resource receipt   2.77        Procedural
-  formal errors   1.58        Procedural
Inventory and equipment management 13.56
- inventory or equipment unaccounted for 49.43        Management
- irregular sale of inventory or equipment   1.28        Management
-  unusable or only partially usable equipment   6.91        Management
- non-existent equipment utilization control   4.26        Procedural
- non-existent inventory control 15.31        Procedural
- inadequate equipment/inventory maintenance 12.90        Procedural
- inappropriate use of equipment   4.26        Procedural
-  inappropriate political propaganda   0.42 Procedural
-  equipment without appropriate label   5.23        Procedural
Remittance management 10.26
-  irregular fees/other requirements to obtain benefits   6.04        Management
- remittance to ineligible individuals 17.84        Management
-  benefit not remitted   4.65        Management
- partial remittance  1.06        Management
- duplication of remittance   5.00        Management
-  program beneficiary not found 10.34        Management
-  delayed remittances   5.17        Management
- non-existent school attendance verification   7.27   Management
- number of beneficiaries below target   2.83        Management
-  irregularities in the payment process   5.34        Procedural
- incomplete register of beneficiaries 33.32        Procedural
-  costly access to obtain benefits   1.10        Procedural
-  formal errors   0.03        Procedural











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































34Table 2: Irregularities and inspections, aggregated by municipality
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
Number of inspections (technically service orders) 28.9 27 12.4 2 112
Number of irregularities 59.5 51 40.3 3 402
Number of irregularities/number of inspections 2.21 1.89 1.48 0.07 18.3
Share of inspections with at least one irregularity 0.67 0.67 0.19 0.07 1
# of irregularities/# of inspections with at least one irregularity 3.17 2.84 1.56 1 18.3
Management irregularities 27.3 22 21.7 0 251
Number of management irregularities/number of inspections 0.99 0.84 0.69 0 6.66
Share of inspections with at least one management irregularity 0.45 0.44 0.17 0 1
# of management irregularities/# of inspections with at least one
management irregularity
2.06 1.86 0.86 1 7.6
Procedural irregularities 31.3 26 25.5 0 292
Number of procedural irregularities/number of inspections 1.18 1 0.96 0 11.5
Share of inspections with at least one procedural irregularity 0.48 0.5 0.22 0 1
Clear management irregularities 22.2 17 20.0 0 244
Share of inspections with clear management irregularities 0.37 0.35 0.17 0 1
Serious procedural irregularities 36.3 30 29.0 0 320
Share of inspections with serious procedural irregularities 0.53 0.54 0.22 0 1
Notes: N=1064. Unit of observation is the municipality.Management irregularities  include  those classified as
Mgmt./Proc. in Appendix I , while clear ma nagement irregularities exclude those. Procedural irregularities exclude
those classified as Mgmt./Proc. in Appendix I, while serious procedural irregularities include those.
35Table 3: Municipality summary statistics (sample means)
Audited No
Judiciary seat in 2005 Yes Yes No Yes No
Single-municipio judiciary district in 2005 Yes No No No No
Year 2000 population support ('000) Full Full Full <40 <40
Number of municipalities 4'442 275 304 485 240 481
Year 2000 municipality characteristics
Municipality population 31'876 41'896 34'744 8'390 18'389 7'823
Judiciary district population 68'150 41'896 50'490 73'865 32'600 71'100
Income per capita 171.8 154.2 191.3 156.4 178.1 156.1
Average years of schooling (25 years and older) 4.05 3.97 4.41 3.76 4.2 3.76
Percentage of residents living in urban areas (%) 58.6 61.9 68.9 52.4 66.1 52.3
Poverty headcount ratio (national poverty line, %) 24.6 29.7 22.7 26.1 24.4 26.1
Poverty gap (%) 49.5 51.6 50.1 50.2 49.7 50.1
Gini coefficient 0.56 0.58 0.58 0.55 0.58 0.55
Radio station (0/1) 0.44 0.59 0.69 0.26 0.65 0.26
Internet access (0/1) 0.22 0.33 0.45 0.08 0.36 0.08
Size of electorate 20'593 26'259 22'514 5'629 12'292 5'315
Electoral turnout 0.87 0.83 0.85 0.87 0.86 0.87
Log distance to state capital 5.29 5.00 5.31 5.34 5.36 5.35
Mayor's party affiliation during 2001-2004 term
Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro 21.2 19.2 23.3 19.6 24.6 19.8
Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira 19.3 19.5 16.7 19.6 15.0 19.8
Partido do Frente Liberal 18.1 16.2 16.4 19.0 17.5 19.0
Partido Progressista Brasileiro 10.5 5.6 11.0 14.1 11.3 14.0
Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro 7.7 6.7 6.3 5.8 5.3 5.8
Major characteristics during 2001-2004 term
Some higher education (completed or not) (0/1) 0.47 0.48 0.62 0.36 0.58 0.36
Some secondary education (completed or not) (0/1) 0.29 0.35 0.22 0.33 0.24 0.34
Some primary education (completed or not) (0/1) 0.23 0.17 0.15 0.29 0.17 0.29
No formal education (0/1) 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01
Age 49.6 50.9 50.2 48.7 50.0 48.6
Male (0/1) 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.95 0.93 0.95
First-term (0/1) - 0.65 0.63 0.59 0.63 0.58
Yes
Notes: See Section 3.3 for data sources. Only the most important political parties are given in the table.
36Table 4: Judiciary districts (comarcas) in Brazil, 1999 and 2005
State Region 2000 2005 1999 2005 Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Acre N 22 22 14 22 1.00 0.00 1 1
Amapá N 16 16 10 11 1.45 0.52 1 2
Amazonas N 62 62 56 62 1.00 0.00 1 1
Pará N 143 143 96 105 1.36 0.77 1 5
Rondônia N 52 52 20 25 2.08 1.08 1 6
Roraima N 15 15 5 7 2.14 1.07 1 4
Tocantins N 139 139 42 45 3.09 1.61 1 7
Alagoas NE 101 102 63 63 1.61 0.85 1 4
Bahia NE 415 417 268 272 1.53 0.81 1 5
Ceará NE 184 184 137 137 1.34 0.60 1 4
Maranhão NE 217 217 79 125 1.74 0.79 1 5
Paraíba NE 223 223 70 72 3.10 1.73 1 9
Pernambuco NE 185 185 112 146 1.23 0.48 1 3
Piauí NE 221 223 89 97 2.30 1.58 1 9
Rio Grande do Norte NE 166 167 62 65 2.57 1.47 1 7
Sergipe NE 75 75 37 37 2.03 1.09 1 5
Goiás CW 242 246 113 119 2.07 0.97 1 6
Mato Grosso CW 126 141 49 55 2.56 1.45 1 6
Mato Grosso do Sul CW 77 78 45 51 1.53 0.70 1 4
Espírito Santo SE 77 78 68 69 1.13 0.34 1 2
Minas Gerais SE 853 853 282 309 2.76 1.73 1 11
Rio de Janeiro SE 91 92 71 73 1.25 0.55 1 3
São Paulo SE 645 645 228 224 2.88 1.79 1 10
Paraná S 399 399 156 155 2.57 1.33 1 6
Rio Grande do Sul S 467 496 157 162 3.06 2.06 1 14
Santa Catarina S 293 293 86 97 3.01 1.65 1 8
Brazil 5506 5563 2415 2605 2.13 1.47 1 14
Notes: The source for judiciary districts in 1999 is a nationwide survey administered by the statistical
institute IBGE. For 2005 the sources are the Códigos da Organização e Divisão Judiciária of each state. See
Section 3.3 for more information. Regions are North, Northeast, Center-west, South-east and South.
Counties per Comarca 2005 # of Comarcas # of Counties
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o
m
e
 
p
e
r
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
,
 
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
y
e
a
r
s
 
o
f
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
i
n
g
,
u
r
b
a
n
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
,
 
p
o
v
e
r
t
y
 
h
e
a
d
c
o
u
n
t
 
r
a
t
i
o
,
 
p
o
v
e
r
t
y
g
a
p
,
 
g
i
n
i
 
c
o
e
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
t
,
 
r
a
d
i
o
 
s
t
a
t
i
o
n
,
 
i
n
t
e
r
n
e
t
 
a
c
c
e
s
s
,
e
l
e
c
t
o
r
a
t
e
 
a
n
d
v
o
t
e
r
t
u
r
n
o
u
t
,
 
d
i
s
t
a
n
c
e
 
t
o
 
s
t
a
t
e
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
.
 
 
M
a
y
o
r
’
s
 
p
a
r
t
y
 
a
f
f
i
l
i
a
t
i
o
n
 
a
r
e
 
a
 
s
e
t
 
o
f
 
d
u
m
m
y
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
 
f
o
r
 
e
a
c
h
 
p
o
l
i
t
i
c
a
l
 
p
a
r
t
y
.
M
a
j
o
r
’
s
 
c
h
a
r
a
c
t
e
r
i
s
t
i
c
s
:
 
f
i
r
s
t
-
t
e
r
m
 
m
a
y
o
r
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
,
e
d
u
c
a
t
i
o
n
 
l
e
v
e
l
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
s
,
 
m
a
l
e
 
d
u
m
m
y
 
a
n
d
 
a
g
e
.
 
 
F
-
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
s
 
t
e
s
t
 
t
h
e
 
j
o
i
n
t
 
n
u
l
l
 
h
y
p
o
t
h
e
s
e
s
 
t
h
a
t
 
n
o
n
e
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
m
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
y
 
c
h
a
r
a
c
t
e
r
i
s
t
i
c
s
 
/
 
p
a
r
t
y
a
f
f
i
l
i
a
t
i
o
n
d
u
m
m
i
e
s
 
/
 
m
a
y
o
r
’
s
 
c
h
a
r
a
c
t
e
r
i
s
t
i
c
s
 
p
r
e
d
i
c
t
t
h
e
 
o
u
t
c
o
m
e
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
.
 
A
l
l
 
s
p
e
c
i
f
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
 
s
t
a
t
e
 
f
i
x
e
d
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
.
S
a
m
p
l
e
 
r
e
s
t
r
i
c
t
e
d
 
t
o
m
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
i
e
s
a
u
d
i
t
e
d
 
t
h
r
o
u
g
h
 
r
o
u
n
d
 
2
1
.
 
 
S
a
m
p
l
e
 
e
x
c
l
u
d
e
s
 
s
i
n
g
l
e
-
m
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
y
 
j
u
d
i
c
i
a
r
y
 
d
i
s
t
r
i
c
t
s
,
 
a
s
 
w
e
l
l
 
a
s
 
m
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
i
e
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
p
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
a
b
o
v
e
4
0
’
0
0
0
.
R
o
b
u
s
t
 
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
 
e
r
r
o
r
s
a
r
e
 
g
i
v
e
n
i
n
 
p
a
r
e
n
t
h
e
s
e
s
.
 
*
,
 
*
*
,
 
a
n
d
 
*
*
*
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
c
e
 
a
t
1
0
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
,
5
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
 
a
n
d
 
1
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
 
l
e
v
e
l
s
r
e
s
p
e
c
t
i
v
e
l
y
.
38T
a
b
l
e
6
:
I
m
p
a
c
t
o
n
t
o
t
a
l
i
r
r
e
g
u
l
a
r
i
t
i
e
s
D
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
:
 
s
h
a
r
e
 
o
f
 
i
n
s
p
e
c
t
i
o
n
s
 
w
i
t
h
a
t
 
l
e
a
s
t
 
o
n
e
 
i
r
r
e
g
u
l
a
r
i
t
y
;
 
m
e
a
n
 
0
.
6
7
,
 
s
t
d
 
0
.
1
9
P
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
s
p
e
c
i
f
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
:
L
i
n
e
a
r
Q
u
a
d
r
a
t
i
c
C
u
b
i
c
C
u
b
i
c
C
u
b
i
c
C
u
b
i
c
C
u
b
i
c
C
u
b
i
c
J
u
d
i
c
i
a
r
y
 
s
e
a
t
 
(
0
/
1
)
-
0
.
0
3
8
-
0
.
0
5
1
*
*
-
0
.
0
5
1
*
*
-
0
.
0
5
5
*
-
0
.
0
5
4
*
*
-
0
.
0
4
9
*
*
-
0
.
0
5
8
*
-
0
.
0
5
9
*
(
0
.
0
2
3
)
(
0
.
0
2
4
)
(
0
.
0
2
4
)
(
0
.
0
2
9
)
(
0
.
0
2
5
)
(
0
.
0
2
5
)
(
0
.
0
3
0
)
(
0
.
0
3
0
)
M
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
y
 
c
h
a
r
a
c
t
e
r
i
s
t
i
c
s
N
N
N
Y
N
N
Y
Y
F
-
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
0
.
7
1
1
.
0
4
0
.
9
6
(
p
-
v
a
l
u
e
)
(
0
.
7
4
)
(
0
.
4
1
)
(
0
.
4
9
)
M
a
y
o
r
’
s
 
p
a
r
t
y
 
a
f
f
i
l
i
a
t
i
o
n
N
N
N
N
Y
N
Y
Y
F
-
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
2
4
.
6
3
.
7
5
2
.
9
1
(
p
-
v
a
l
u
e
)
(
0
.
0
0
)
(
0
.
0
0
)
(
0
.
0
0
)
M
a
y
o
r
’
s
 
c
h
a
r
a
c
t
e
r
i
s
t
i
c
s
N
N
N
N
N
Y
N
Y
F
-
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
0
.
5
0
0
.
6
2
(
p
-
v
a
l
u
e
)
(
0
.
8
7
)
(
0
.
7
8
)
O
b
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
o
n
s
7
2
1
7
2
1
7
2
1
7
2
1
7
2
1
7
1
3
7
2
1
7
1
3
R
-
s
q
u
a
r
e
d
0
.
1
9
3
0
.
1
9
1
0
.
1
9
1
0
.
2
0
1
0
.
2
1
7
0
.
1
9
7
0
.
2
3
2
0
.
2
3
6
N
o
t
e
s
:
 
I
V
 
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
i
o
n
s
.
T
h
e
 
i
n
s
t
r
u
m
e
n
t
 
f
o
r
 
j
u
d
i
c
i
a
r
y
 
s
e
a
t
 
i
s
t
h
e
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
 
f
o
r
 
j
u
d
i
c
i
a
r
y
-
d
i
s
t
r
i
c
t
-
s
p
e
c
i
f
i
c
m
a
x
i
m
u
m
 
p
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
.
M
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
y
 
c
h
a
r
a
c
t
e
r
i
s
t
i
c
s
,
 
a
l
l
 
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
d
 
i
n
 
2
0
0
0
:
j
u
d
i
c
i
a
r
y
 
d
i
s
t
r
i
c
t
 
p
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
,
i
n
c
o
m
e
 
p
e
r
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
,
 
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
y
e
a
r
s
 
o
f
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
i
n
g
,
u
r
b
a
n
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
,
 
p
o
v
e
r
t
y
 
h
e
a
d
c
o
u
n
t
 
r
a
t
i
o
,
 
p
o
v
e
r
t
y
g
a
p
,
 
g
i
n
i
 
c
o
e
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
t
,
 
r
a
d
i
o
 
s
t
a
t
i
o
n
,
 
i
n
t
e
r
n
e
t
 
a
c
c
e
s
s
,
e
l
e
c
t
o
r
a
t
e
 
a
n
d
v
o
t
e
r
t
u
r
n
o
u
t
,
 
d
i
s
t
a
n
c
e
t
o
 
s
t
a
t
e
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
.
 
 
M
a
y
o
r
’
s
 
p
a
r
t
y
 
a
f
f
i
l
i
a
t
i
o
n
 
a
r
e
 
a
 
s
e
t
 
o
f
 
d
u
m
m
y
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
 
f
o
r
 
e
a
c
h
 
p
o
l
i
t
i
c
a
l
 
p
a
r
t
y
.
M
a
j
o
r
’
s
 
c
h
a
r
a
c
t
e
r
i
s
t
i
c
s
:
 
f
i
r
s
t
-
t
e
r
m
m
a
y
o
r
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
,
 
e
d
u
c
a
t
i
o
n
 
l
e
v
e
l
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
s
,
 
m
a
l
e
 
d
u
m
m
y
 
a
n
d
 
a
g
e
.
 
 
F
-
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
s
 
t
e
s
t
 
t
h
e
 
j
o
i
n
t
 
n
u
l
l
 
h
y
p
o
t
h
e
s
e
s
 
t
h
a
t
 
n
o
n
e
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
m
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
y
 
c
h
a
r
a
c
t
e
r
i
s
t
i
c
s
 
/
 
p
a
r
t
y
 
a
f
f
i
l
i
a
t
i
o
n
d
u
m
m
i
e
s
 
/
 
m
a
y
o
r
’
s
 
c
h
a
r
a
c
t
e
r
i
s
t
i
c
s
 
p
r
e
d
i
c
t
t
h
e
 
o
u
t
c
o
m
e
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
.
 
A
l
l
 
s
p
e
c
i
f
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
 
s
t
a
t
e
 
f
i
x
e
d
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
.
S
a
m
p
l
e
 
r
e
s
t
r
i
c
t
e
d
 
t
o
 
m
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
i
e
s
a
u
d
i
t
e
d
 
t
h
r
o
u
g
h
 
r
o
u
n
d
 
2
1
.
 
 
S
a
m
p
l
e
 
e
x
c
l
u
d
e
s
 
s
i
n
g
l
e
-
m
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
y
j
u
d
i
c
i
a
r
y
 
d
i
s
t
r
i
c
t
s
,
 
a
s
 
w
e
l
l
 
a
s
 
m
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
i
e
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
p
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
a
b
o
v
e
 
4
0
’
0
0
0
.
R
o
b
u
s
t
 
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
 
e
r
r
o
r
s
a
r
e
 
g
i
v
e
n
i
n
 
p
a
r
e
n
t
h
e
s
e
s
.
 
*
,
 
*
*
,
 
a
n
d
*
*
*
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
c
e
 
a
t
1
0
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
,
5
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
 
a
n
d
 
1
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
 
l
e
v
e
l
s
 
r
e
s
p
e
c
t
i
v
e
l
y
.
39T
a
b
l
e
7
:
I
m
p
a
c
t
o
n
m
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t
i
r
r
e
g
u
l
a
r
i
t
i
e
s
D
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
:
 
s
h
a
r
e
 
o
f
 
i
n
s
p
e
c
t
i
o
n
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
a
t
 
l
e
a
s
t
 
o
n
e
 
m
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t
 
i
r
r
e
g
u
l
a
r
i
t
y
;
 
m
e
a
n
 
0
.
4
4
,
 
s
t
d
 
0
.
1
6
P
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
s
p
e
c
i
f
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
:
L
i
n
e
a
r
Q
u
a
d
r
a
t
i
c
C
u
b
i
c
C
u
b
i
c
C
u
b
i
c
C
u
b
i
c
C
u
b
i
c
C
u
b
i
c
J
u
d
i
c
i
a
r
y
 
s
e
a
t
(
0
/
1
)
-
0
.
0
2
9
-
0
.
0
4
6
*
*
-
0
.
0
4
6
*
*
-
0
.
0
4
9
*
-
0
.
0
4
5
*
*
-
0
.
0
4
4
*
*
-
0
.
0
4
9
*
-
0
.
0
4
9
*
(
0
.
0
2
1
)
(
0
.
0
2
2
)
(
0
.
0
2
1
)
(
0
.
0
2
6
)
(
0
.
0
2
2
)
(
0
.
0
2
2
)
(
0
.
0
2
6
)
(
0
.
0
2
7
)
M
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
y
 
c
h
a
r
a
c
t
e
r
i
s
t
i
c
s
N
N
N
Y
N
N
Y
Y
F
-
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
0
.
8
4
1
.
0
1
0
.
9
3
(
p
-
v
a
l
u
e
)
(
0
.
6
1
)
(
0
.
4
3
)
(
0
.
5
2
)
M
a
y
o
r
’
s
 
p
a
r
t
y
 
a
f
f
i
l
i
a
t
i
o
n
N
N
N
N
Y
N
Y
Y
F
-
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
1
0
3
.
8
7
.
3
5
5
.
5
3
(
p
-
v
a
l
u
e
)
(
0
.
0
0
)
(
0
.
0
0
)
(
0
.
0
0
)
M
a
y
o
r
’
s
 
c
h
a
r
a
c
t
e
r
i
s
t
i
c
s
N
N
N
N
N
Y
N
Y
F
-
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
0
.
5
3
0
.
7
5
(
p
-
v
a
l
u
e
)
(
0
.
8
5
)
(
0
.
6
6
)
O
b
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
o
n
s
7
2
1
7
2
1
7
2
1
7
2
1
7
2
1
7
1
3
7
2
1
7
1
3
R
-
s
q
u
a
r
e
d
0
.
1
8
4
0
.
1
8
8
0
.
1
8
8
0
.
2
0
0
0
.
2
1
6
0
.
1
9
6
0
.
2
3
0
0
.
2
3
9
N
o
t
e
s
:
 
I
V
 
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
i
o
n
s
.
T
h
e
 
i
n
s
t
r
u
m
e
n
t
 
f
o
r
 
j
u
d
i
c
i
a
r
y
 
s
e
a
t
 
i
s
t
h
e
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
 
f
o
r
 
j
u
d
i
c
i
a
r
y
-
d
i
s
t
r
i
c
t
-
s
p
e
c
i
f
i
c
m
a
x
i
m
u
m
 
p
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
.
M
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
y
 
c
h
a
r
a
c
t
e
r
i
s
t
i
c
s
,
 
a
l
l
 
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
d
 
i
n
 
2
0
0
0
:
j
u
d
i
c
i
a
r
y
 
d
i
s
t
r
i
c
t
 
p
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
,
i
n
c
o
m
e
 
p
e
r
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
,
 
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
y
e
a
r
s
 
o
f
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
i
n
g
,
u
r
b
a
n
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
,
 
p
o
v
e
r
t
y
 
h
e
a
d
c
o
u
n
t
 
r
a
t
i
o
,
 
p
o
v
e
r
t
y
g
a
p
,
 
g
i
n
i
 
c
o
e
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
t
,
 
r
a
d
i
o
 
s
t
a
t
i
o
n
,
 
i
n
t
e
r
n
e
t
 
a
c
c
e
s
s
,
e
l
e
c
t
o
r
a
t
e
 
a
n
d
 
v
o
t
e
r
t
u
r
n
o
u
t
,
 
d
i
s
t
a
n
c
e
t
o
 
s
t
a
t
e
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
.
 
 
M
a
y
o
r
’
s
 
p
a
r
t
y
 
a
f
f
i
l
i
a
t
i
o
n
 
a
r
e
 
a
 
s
e
t
 
o
f
 
d
u
m
m
y
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
 
f
o
r
 
e
a
c
h
 
p
o
l
i
t
i
c
a
l
 
p
a
r
t
y
.
M
a
j
o
r
’
s
 
c
h
a
r
a
c
t
e
r
i
s
t
i
c
s
:
 
f
i
r
s
t
-
t
e
r
m
m
a
y
o
r
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
,
 
e
d
u
c
a
t
i
o
n
 
l
e
v
e
l
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
s
,
 
m
a
l
e
 
d
u
m
m
y
 
a
n
d
 
a
g
e
.
 
 
F
-
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
s
 
t
e
s
t
 
t
h
e
 
j
o
i
n
t
 
n
u
l
l
 
h
y
p
o
t
h
e
s
e
s
 
t
h
a
t
 
n
o
n
e
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
m
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
y
 
c
h
a
r
a
c
t
e
r
i
s
t
i
c
s
 
/
 
p
a
r
t
y
 
a
f
f
i
l
i
a
t
i
o
n
d
u
m
m
i
e
s
 
/
 
m
a
y
o
r
’
s
 
c
h
a
r
a
c
t
e
r
i
s
t
i
c
s
 
p
r
e
d
i
c
t
t
h
e
 
o
u
t
c
o
m
e
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
.
 
A
l
l
 
s
p
e
c
i
f
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
 
s
t
a
t
e
 
f
i
x
e
d
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
.
S
a
m
p
l
e
 
r
e
s
t
r
i
c
t
e
d
 
t
o
 
m
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
i
e
s
 
a
u
d
i
t
e
d
 
t
h
r
o
u
g
h
 
r
o
u
n
d
 
2
1
.
 
 
S
a
m
p
l
e
 
e
x
c
l
u
d
e
s
 
s
i
n
g
l
e
-
m
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
y
j
u
d
i
c
i
a
r
y
 
d
i
s
t
r
i
c
t
s
,
 
a
s
 
w
e
l
l
 
a
s
 
m
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
i
e
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
p
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
a
b
o
v
e
 
4
0
’
0
0
0
.
R
o
b
u
s
t
 
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
 
e
r
r
o
r
s
a
r
e
 
g
i
v
e
n
i
n
 
p
a
r
e
n
t
h
e
s
e
s
.
 
*
,
 
*
*
,
 
a
n
d
*
*
*
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
c
e
 
a
t
1
0
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
,
5
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
 
a
n
d
 
1
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
 
l
e
v
e
l
s
 
r
e
s
p
e
c
t
i
v
e
l
y
.
40T
a
b
l
e
8
:
I
m
p
a
c
t
o
n
t
o
t
a
l
i
r
r
e
g
u
l
a
r
i
t
i
e
s
,
i
n
t
e
n
s
i
v
e
m
a
r
g
i
n
D
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
:
 
t
o
t
a
l
 
i
r
r
e
g
u
l
a
r
i
t
i
e
s
 
/
 
n
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
i
n
s
p
e
c
t
i
o
n
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
a
t
 
l
e
a
s
t
 
o
n
e
 
i
r
r
e
g
u
l
a
r
i
t
y
;
 
m
e
a
n
3
.
0
5
,
 
s
t
d
1
.
2
8
P
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
s
p
e
c
i
f
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
:
L
i
n
e
a
r
Q
u
a
d
r
a
t
i
c
C
u
b
i
c
C
u
b
i
c
C
u
b
i
c
C
u
b
i
c
C
u
b
i
c
C
u
b
i
c
J
u
d
i
c
i
a
r
y
 
s
e
a
t
 
(
0
/
1
)
-
0
.
0
6
5
-
0
.
0
0
9
-
0
.
0
1
3
0
.
2
5
9
-
0
.
0
5
1
-
0
.
0
3
4
0
.
1
9
3
0
.
1
6
5
(
0
.
2
0
1
)
(
0
.
2
2
2
)
(
0
.
2
2
3
)
(
0
.
2
3
8
)
(
0
.
2
1
8
)
(
0
.
2
1
4
)
(
0
.
2
3
2
)
(
0
.
2
2
9
)
M
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
y
 
c
h
a
r
a
c
t
e
r
i
s
t
i
c
s
N
N
N
Y
N
N
Y
Y
F
-
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
0
.
9
1
1
.
0
0
0
.
8
4
(
p
-
v
a
l
u
e
)
(
0
.
5
4
)
(
0
.
4
5
)
(
0
.
6
1
)
M
a
y
o
r
’
s
 
p
a
r
t
y
 
a
f
f
i
l
i
a
t
i
o
n
N
N
N
N
Y
N
Y
Y
F
-
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
4
6
5
5
3
2
3
.
9
(
p
-
v
a
l
u
e
)
(
0
.
0
0
)
(
0
.
0
0
)
(
0
.
0
0
)
M
a
y
o
r
’
s
 
c
h
a
r
a
c
t
e
r
i
s
t
i
c
s
N
N
N
N
N
Y
N
Y
F
-
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
0
.
5
8
0
.
6
8
(
p
-
v
a
l
u
e
)
(
0
.
8
1
)
(
0
.
7
3
)
O
b
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
o
n
s
7
2
1
7
2
1
7
2
1
7
2
1
7
2
1
7
1
3
7
2
1
7
1
3
R
-
s
q
u
a
r
e
d
0
.
1
8
2
0
.
1
8
4
0
.
1
8
6
0
.
2
0
6
0
.
2
3
9
0
.
1
9
1
0
.
2
5
9
0
.
2
6
6
N
o
t
e
s
:
 
I
V
 
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
i
o
n
s
.
T
h
e
 
i
n
s
t
r
u
m
e
n
t
 
f
o
r
 
j
u
d
i
c
i
a
r
y
 
s
e
a
t
 
i
s
t
h
e
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
 
f
o
r
 
j
u
d
i
c
i
a
r
y
-
d
i
s
t
r
i
c
t
-
s
p
e
c
i
f
i
c
m
a
x
i
m
u
m
 
p
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
.
M
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
y
 
c
h
a
r
a
c
t
e
r
i
s
t
i
c
s
,
 
a
l
l
 
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
d
 
i
n
 
2
0
0
0
:
j
u
d
i
c
i
a
r
y
 
d
i
s
t
r
i
c
t
 
p
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
,
i
n
c
o
m
e
 
p
e
r
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
,
 
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
y
e
a
r
s
 
o
f
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
i
n
g
,
u
r
b
a
n
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
,
 
p
o
v
e
r
t
y
 
h
e
a
d
c
o
u
n
t
 
r
a
t
i
o
,
 
p
o
v
e
r
t
y
g
a
p
,
 
g
i
n
i
 
c
o
e
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
t
,
 
r
a
d
i
o
 
s
t
a
t
i
o
n
,
 
i
n
t
e
r
n
e
t
 
a
c
c
e
s
s
,
e
l
e
c
t
o
r
a
t
e
 
a
n
d
 
v
o
t
e
r
t
u
r
n
o
u
t
,
 
d
i
s
t
a
n
c
e
t
o
 
s
t
a
t
e
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
.
 
 
M
a
y
o
r
’
s
 
p
a
r
t
y
 
a
f
f
i
l
i
a
t
i
o
n
 
a
r
e
 
a
 
s
e
t
 
o
f
 
d
u
m
m
y
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
 
f
o
r
 
e
a
c
h
 
p
o
l
i
t
i
c
a
l
 
p
a
r
t
y
.
M
a
j
o
r
’
s
 
c
h
a
r
a
c
t
e
r
i
s
t
i
c
s
:
 
f
i
r
s
t
-
t
e
r
m
m
a
y
o
r
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
,
 
e
d
u
c
a
t
i
o
n
 
l
e
v
e
l
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
s
,
 
m
a
l
e
 
d
u
m
m
y
 
a
n
d
 
a
g
e
.
 
 
F
-
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
s
 
t
e
s
t
 
t
h
e
 
j
o
i
n
t
 
n
u
l
l
 
h
y
p
o
t
h
e
s
e
s
 
t
h
a
t
 
n
o
n
e
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
m
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
y
 
c
h
a
r
a
c
t
e
r
i
s
t
i
c
s
 
/
 
p
a
r
t
y
 
a
f
f
i
l
i
a
t
i
o
n
d
u
m
m
i
e
s
 
/
 
m
a
y
o
r
’
s
 
c
h
a
r
a
c
t
e
r
i
s
t
i
c
s
 
p
r
e
d
i
c
t
t
h
e
 
o
u
t
c
o
m
e
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
.
 
A
l
l
 
s
p
e
c
i
f
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
 
s
t
a
t
e
 
f
i
x
e
d
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
.
S
a
m
p
l
e
 
r
e
s
t
r
i
c
t
e
d
 
t
o
 
m
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
i
e
s
 
a
u
d
i
t
e
d
 
t
h
r
o
u
g
h
 
r
o
u
n
d
 
2
1
.
 
 
S
a
m
p
l
e
 
e
x
c
l
u
d
e
s
 
s
i
n
g
l
e
-
m
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
y
j
u
d
i
c
i
a
r
y
 
d
i
s
t
r
i
c
t
s
,
 
a
s
 
w
e
l
l
 
a
s
 
m
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
i
e
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
p
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
a
b
o
v
e
 
4
0
’
0
0
0
.
R
o
b
u
s
t
 
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
 
e
r
r
o
r
s
a
r
e
 
g
i
v
e
n
i
n
 
p
a
r
e
n
t
h
e
s
e
s
.
 
*
,
 
*
*
,
 
a
n
d
*
*
*
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
c
e
 
a
t
1
0
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
,
5
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
 
a
n
d
 
1
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
 
l
e
v
e
l
s
 
r
e
s
p
e
c
t
i
v
e
l
y
.
41T
a
b
l
e
9
:
I
m
p
a
c
t
o
n
p
r
o
c
e
d
u
r
a
l
i
r
r
e
g
u
l
a
r
i
t
i
e
s
D
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
:
s
h
a
r
e
 
o
f
 
i
n
s
p
e
c
t
i
o
n
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
a
t
 
l
e
a
s
t
 
o
n
e
 
p
r
o
c
e
d
u
r
a
l
 
i
r
r
e
g
u
l
a
r
i
t
y
;
 
m
e
a
n
 
0
.
4
9
,
 
s
t
d
 
0
.
2
0
P
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
s
p
e
c
i
f
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
:
L
i
n
e
a
r
Q
u
a
d
r
a
t
i
c
C
u
b
i
c
C
u
b
i
c
C
u
b
i
c
C
u
b
i
c
C
u
b
i
c
C
u
b
i
c
J
u
d
i
c
i
a
r
y
 
s
e
a
t
 
(
0
/
1
)
-
0
.
0
2
7
-
0
.
0
1
5
-
0
.
0
1
6
0
.
0
0
6
-
0
.
0
1
8
-
0
.
0
2
1
0
.
0
0
4
0
.
0
0
1
(
0
.
0
2
8
)
(
0
.
0
2
9
)
(
0
.
0
2
9
)
(
0
.
0
3
3
)
(
0
.
0
2
9
)
(
0
.
0
2
9
)
(
0
.
0
3
4
)
(
0
.
0
3
5
)
M
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
y
 
c
h
a
r
a
c
t
e
r
i
s
t
i
c
s
N
N
N
Y
N
N
Y
Y
F
-
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
1
.
3
7
1
.
7
8
1
.
7
2
(
p
-
v
a
l
u
e
)
(
0
.
1
8
)
(
0
.
0
5
)
(
0
.
0
6
)
M
a
y
o
r
’
s
 
p
a
r
t
y
 
a
f
f
i
l
i
a
t
i
o
n
N
N
N
N
Y
N
Y
Y
F
-
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
4
.
3
5
3
.
9
8
3
.
2
5
(
p
-
v
a
l
u
e
)
(
0
.
0
0
)
(
0
.
0
0
)
(
0
.
0
0
)
M
a
y
o
r
’
s
 
c
h
a
r
a
c
t
e
r
i
s
t
i
c
s
N
N
N
N
N
Y
N
Y
F
-
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
0
.
9
7
1
.
1
8
(
p
-
v
a
l
u
e
)
(
0
.
4
6
)
(
0
.
3
1
)
O
b
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
o
n
s
7
2
1
7
2
1
7
2
1
7
2
1
7
2
1
7
1
3
7
2
1
7
1
3
R
-
s
q
u
a
r
e
d
0
.
1
4
9
0
.
1
5
4
0
.
1
5
6
0
.
1
7
9
0
.
1
8
4
0
.
1
6
2
0
.
2
1
3
0
.
2
1
9
N
o
t
e
s
:
 
I
V
 
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
i
o
n
s
.
T
h
e
 
i
n
s
t
r
u
m
e
n
t
 
f
o
r
 
j
u
d
i
c
i
a
r
y
 
s
e
a
t
 
i
s
t
h
e
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
 
f
o
r
 
j
u
d
i
c
i
a
r
y
-
d
i
s
t
r
i
c
t
-
s
p
e
c
i
f
i
c
m
a
x
i
m
u
m
 
p
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
.
M
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
y
 
c
h
a
r
a
c
t
e
r
i
s
t
i
c
s
,
 
a
l
l
 
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
d
 
i
n
 
2
0
0
0
:
j
u
d
i
c
i
a
r
y
 
d
i
s
t
r
i
c
t
 
p
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
,
i
n
c
o
m
e
 
p
e
r
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
,
 
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
y
e
a
r
s
 
o
f
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
i
n
g
,
u
r
b
a
n
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
,
 
p
o
v
e
r
t
y
 
h
e
a
d
c
o
u
n
t
 
r
a
t
i
o
,
 
p
o
v
e
r
t
y
g
a
p
,
 
g
i
n
i
 
c
o
e
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
t
,
 
r
a
d
i
o
 
s
t
a
t
i
o
n
,
 
i
n
t
e
r
n
e
t
 
a
c
c
e
s
s
,
e
l
e
c
t
o
r
a
t
e
 
a
n
d
 
v
o
t
e
r
t
u
r
n
o
u
t
,
 
d
i
s
t
a
n
c
e
t
o
 
s
t
a
t
e
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
.
 
 
M
a
y
o
r
’
s
 
p
a
r
t
y
 
a
f
f
i
l
i
a
t
i
o
n
 
a
r
e
 
a
 
s
e
t
 
o
f
d
u
m
m
y
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
 
f
o
r
 
e
a
c
h
 
p
o
l
i
t
i
c
a
l
 
p
a
r
t
y
.
M
a
j
o
r
’
s
 
c
h
a
r
a
c
t
e
r
i
s
t
i
c
s
:
 
f
i
r
s
t
-
t
e
r
m
m
a
y
o
r
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
,
 
e
d
u
c
a
t
i
o
n
 
l
e
v
e
l
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
s
,
 
m
a
l
e
 
d
u
m
m
y
 
a
n
d
 
a
g
e
.
 
 
F
-
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
s
 
t
e
s
t
 
t
h
e
 
j
o
i
n
t
 
n
u
l
l
 
h
y
p
o
t
h
e
s
e
s
 
t
h
a
t
 
n
o
n
e
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
m
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
y
 
c
h
a
r
a
c
t
e
r
i
s
t
i
c
s
 
/
 
p
a
r
t
y
 
a
f
f
i
l
i
a
t
i
o
n
d
u
m
m
i
e
s
 
/
 
m
a
y
o
r
’
s
 
c
h
a
r
a
c
t
e
r
i
s
t
i
c
s
 
p
r
e
d
i
c
t
t
h
e
 
o
u
t
c
o
m
e
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
.
 
A
l
l
 
s
p
e
c
i
f
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
 
s
t
a
t
e
 
f
i
x
e
d
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
.
S
a
m
p
l
e
 
r
e
s
t
r
i
c
t
e
d
 
t
o
 
m
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
i
e
s
 
a
u
d
i
t
e
d
 
t
h
r
o
u
g
h
 
r
o
u
n
d
 
2
1
.
 
 
S
a
m
p
l
e
 
e
x
c
l
u
d
e
s
 
s
i
n
g
l
e
-
m
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
y
j
u
d
i
c
i
a
r
y
 
d
i
s
t
r
i
c
t
s
,
 
a
s
 
w
e
l
l
 
a
s
 
m
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
i
e
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
p
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
a
b
o
v
e
 
4
0
’
0
0
0
.
R
o
b
u
s
t
 
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
 
e
r
r
o
r
s
a
r
e
 
g
i
v
e
n
i
n
 
p
a
r
e
n
t
h
e
s
e
s
.
 
*
,
 
*
*
,
 
a
n
d
*
*
*
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
c
e
 
a
t
1
0
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
,
5
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
 
a
n
d
 
1
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
 
l
e
v
e
l
s
 
r
e
s
p
e
c
t
i
v
e
l
y
.
42T
a
b
l
e
1
0
:
I
m
p
a
c
t
o
n
t
o
t
a
l
i
r
r
e
g
u
l
a
r
i
t
i
e
s
,
b
r
o
a
d
e
r
s
u
p
p
o
r
t
D
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
:
s
h
a
r
e
 
o
f
 
i
n
s
p
e
c
t
i
o
n
s
 
w
i
t
h
a
t
 
l
e
a
s
t
 
o
n
e
 
i
r
r
e
g
u
l
a
r
i
t
y
;
 
m
e
a
n
 
0
.
6
7
,
 
s
t
d
 
0
.
1
9
P
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
s
p
e
c
i
f
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
:
L
i
n
e
a
r
Q
u
a
d
r
a
t
i
c
C
u
b
i
c
C
u
b
i
c
C
u
b
i
c
C
u
b
i
c
C
u
b
i
c
C
u
b
i
c
J
u
d
i
c
i
a
r
y
 
s
e
a
t
 
(
0
/
1
)
-
0
.
0
4
4
*
*
-
0
.
0
4
7
*
*
-
0
.
0
4
9
*
*
-
0
.
0
5
4
*
-
0
.
0
5
3
*
*
-
0
.
0
4
9
*
*
-
0
.
0
5
8
*
-
0
.
0
6
1
*
*
(
0
.
0
2
2
)
(
0
.
0
2
4
)
(
0
.
0
2
4
)
(
0
.
0
2
9
)
(
0
.
0
2
5
)
(
0
.
0
2
4
)
(
0
.
0
3
0
)
(
0
.
0
3
0
)
M
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
y
 
c
h
a
r
a
c
t
e
r
i
s
t
i
c
s
N
N
N
Y
N
N
Y
Y
F
-
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
0
.
6
5
1
.
0
3
0
.
9
7
(
p
-
v
a
l
u
e
)
(
0
.
8
0
)
(
0
.
4
1
)
(
0
.
4
8
)
M
a
y
o
r
’
s
 
p
a
r
t
y
 
a
f
f
i
l
i
a
t
i
o
n
N
N
N
N
Y
N
Y
Y
F
-
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
2
7
.
4
3
.
7
5
2
.
9
3
(
p
-
v
a
l
u
e
)
(
0
.
0
0
)
(
0
.
0
0
)
(
0
.
0
0
)
M
a
y
o
r
’
s
 
c
h
a
r
a
c
t
e
r
i
s
t
i
c
s
N
N
N
N
N
Y
N
Y
F
-
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
0
.
5
6
0
.
7
0
(
p
-
v
a
l
u
e
)
(
0
.
8
3
)
(
0
.
7
0
)
O
b
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
o
n
s
7
3
9
7
3
9
7
3
9
7
3
9
7
3
9
7
3
1
7
3
9
7
3
1
R
-
s
q
u
a
r
e
d
0
.
1
9
3
0
.
1
9
2
0
.
1
9
6
0
.
2
0
5
0
.
2
2
3
0
.
2
0
3
0
.
2
3
7
0
.
2
4
2
N
o
t
e
s
:
 
I
V
 
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
i
o
n
s
.
T
h
e
 
i
n
s
t
r
u
m
e
n
t
 
f
o
r
 
j
u
d
i
c
i
a
r
y
 
s
e
a
t
 
i
s
t
h
e
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
 
f
o
r
 
j
u
d
i
c
i
a
r
y
-
d
i
s
t
r
i
c
t
-
s
p
e
c
i
f
i
c
m
a
x
i
m
u
m
 
p
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
.
M
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
y
 
c
h
a
r
a
c
t
e
r
i
s
t
i
c
s
,
 
a
l
l
 
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
d
 
i
n
 
2
0
0
0
:
j
u
d
i
c
i
a
r
y
 
d
i
s
t
r
i
c
t
 
p
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
,
i
n
c
o
m
e
 
p
e
r
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
,
 
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
y
e
a
r
s
 
o
f
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
i
n
g
,
u
r
b
a
n
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
,
 
p
o
v
e
r
t
y
 
h
e
a
d
c
o
u
n
t
 
r
a
t
i
o
,
 
p
o
v
e
r
t
y
g
a
p
,
 
g
i
n
i
 
c
o
e
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
t
,
 
r
a
d
i
o
 
s
t
a
t
i
o
n
,
 
i
n
t
e
r
n
e
t
 
a
c
c
e
s
s
,
e
l
e
c
t
o
r
a
t
e
 
a
n
d
 
v
o
t
e
r
t
u
r
n
o
u
t
,
 
d
i
s
t
a
n
c
e
t
o
 
s
t
a
t
e
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
.
 
 
M
a
y
o
r
’
s
 
p
a
r
t
y
 
a
f
f
i
l
i
a
t
i
o
n
 
a
r
e
 
a
 
s
e
t
 
o
f
d
u
m
m
y
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
 
f
o
r
 
e
a
c
h
 
p
o
l
i
t
i
c
a
l
 
p
a
r
t
y
.
M
a
j
o
r
’
s
 
c
h
a
r
a
c
t
e
r
i
s
t
i
c
s
:
 
f
i
r
s
t
-
t
e
r
m
m
a
y
o
r
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
,
 
e
d
u
c
a
t
i
o
n
 
l
e
v
e
l
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
s
,
 
m
a
l
e
 
d
u
m
m
y
 
a
n
d
 
a
g
e
.
 
 
F
-
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
s
 
t
e
s
t
 
t
h
e
 
j
o
i
n
t
 
n
u
l
l
 
h
y
p
o
t
h
e
s
e
s
 
t
h
a
t
 
n
o
n
e
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
m
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
y
 
c
h
a
r
a
c
t
e
r
i
s
t
i
c
s
 
/
 
p
a
r
t
y
 
a
f
f
i
l
i
a
t
i
o
n
d
u
m
m
i
e
s
 
/
 
m
a
y
o
r
’
s
 
c
h
a
r
a
c
t
e
r
i
s
t
i
c
s
 
p
r
e
d
i
c
t
t
h
e
 
o
u
t
c
o
m
e
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
.
 
A
l
l
 
s
p
e
c
i
f
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
 
s
t
a
t
e
 
f
i
x
e
d
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
.
S
a
m
p
l
e
 
r
e
s
t
r
i
c
t
e
d
 
t
o
 
m
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
i
e
s
 
a
u
d
i
t
e
d
 
t
h
r
o
u
g
h
 
r
o
u
n
d
 
2
1
.
 
 
S
a
m
p
l
e
 
e
x
c
l
u
d
e
s
 
s
i
n
g
l
e
-
m
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
y
j
u
d
i
c
i
a
r
y
 
d
i
s
t
r
i
c
t
s
,
 
a
s
 
w
e
l
l
 
a
s
 
m
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
i
e
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
p
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
a
b
o
v
e
5
1
’
0
0
0
.
R
o
b
u
s
t
 
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
 
e
r
r
o
r
s
a
r
e
 
g
i
v
e
n
i
n
 
p
a
r
e
n
t
h
e
s
e
s
.
 
*
,
 
*
*
,
 
a
n
d
*
*
*
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
c
e
 
a
t
1
0
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
,
5
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
 
a
n
d
 
1
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
 
l
e
v
e
l
s
 
r
e
s
p
e
c
t
i
v
e
l
y
.
43T
a
b
l
e
1
1
:
I
m
p
a
c
t
o
n
c
l
e
a
r
m
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t
i
r
r
e
g
u
l
a
r
i
t
i
e
s
D
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
:
 
s
h
a
r
e
 
o
f
 
i
n
s
p
e
c
t
i
o
n
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
a
t
 
l
e
a
s
t
 
o
n
e
 
c
l
e
a
r
 
m
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t
 
i
r
r
e
g
u
l
a
r
i
t
y
;
 
m
e
a
n
 
0
.
3
8
,
 
s
t
d
 
0
.
1
6
P
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
s
p
e
c
i
f
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
:
L
i
n
e
a
r
Q
u
a
d
r
a
t
i
c
C
u
b
i
c
C
u
b
i
c
C
u
b
i
c
C
u
b
i
c
C
u
b
i
c
C
u
b
i
c
J
u
d
i
c
i
a
r
y
 
s
e
a
t
 
(
0
/
1
)
-
0
.
0
2
6
-
0
.
0
4
2
*
-
0
.
0
4
2
*
-
0
.
0
4
5
*
-
0
.
0
4
2
*
-
0
.
0
3
8
*
-
0
.
0
4
7
*
-
0
.
0
4
5
*
(
0
.
0
2
1
)
(
0
.
0
2
2
)
(
0
.
0
2
2
)
(
0
.
0
2
6
)
(
0
.
0
2
2
)
(
0
.
0
2
2
)
(
0
.
0
2
6
)
(
0
.
0
2
7
)
M
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
y
 
c
h
a
r
a
c
t
e
r
i
s
t
i
c
s
N
N
N
Y
N
N
Y
Y
F
-
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
0
.
8
9
0
.
9
4
1
.
0
2
(
p
-
v
a
l
u
e
)
(
0
.
5
5
)
(
0
.
5
1
)
(
0
.
4
3
)
M
a
y
o
r
’
s
 
p
a
r
t
y
 
a
f
f
i
l
i
a
t
i
o
n
N
N
N
N
Y
N
Y
Y
F
-
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
9
2
.
1
6
.
2
4
4
.
7
4
(
p
-
v
a
l
u
e
)
(
0
.
0
0
)
(
0
.
0
0
)
(
0
.
0
0
)
M
a
y
o
r
’
s
 
c
h
a
r
a
c
t
e
r
i
s
t
i
c
s
N
N
N
N
N
Y
N
Y
F
-
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
0
.
8
1
1
.
0
7
(
p
-
v
a
l
u
e
)
(
0
.
6
0
)
(
0
.
3
8
)
O
b
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
o
n
s
7
2
1
7
2
1
7
2
1
7
2
1
7
2
1
7
1
3
7
2
1
7
1
3
R
-
s
q
u
a
r
e
d
0
.
1
5
1
0
.
1
5
5
0
.
1
5
7
0
.
1
7
0
0
.
1
7
6
0
.
1
7
0
0
.
1
9
0
0
.
2
0
6
N
o
t
e
s
:
 
I
V
 
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
i
o
n
s
.
T
h
e
 
i
n
s
t
r
u
m
e
n
t
 
f
o
r
 
j
u
d
i
c
i
a
r
y
 
s
e
a
t
 
i
s
t
h
e
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
 
f
o
r
 
j
u
d
i
c
i
a
r
y
-
d
i
s
t
r
i
c
t
-
s
p
e
c
i
f
i
c
m
a
x
i
m
u
m
 
p
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
.
M
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
y
 
c
h
a
r
a
c
t
e
r
i
s
t
i
c
s
,
 
a
l
l
 
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
d
 
i
n
 
2
0
0
0
:
j
u
d
i
c
i
a
r
y
 
d
i
s
t
r
i
c
t
 
p
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
,
i
n
c
o
m
e
 
p
e
r
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
,
 
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
y
e
a
r
s
 
o
f
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
i
n
g
,
u
r
b
a
n
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
,
 
p
o
v
e
r
t
y
 
h
e
a
d
c
o
u
n
t
 
r
a
t
i
o
,
 
p
o
v
e
r
t
y
g
a
p
,
 
g
i
n
i
 
c
o
e
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
t
,
 
r
a
d
i
o
 
s
t
a
t
i
o
n
,
 
i
n
t
e
r
n
e
t
 
a
c
c
e
s
s
,
e
l
e
c
t
o
r
a
t
e
 
a
n
d
 
v
o
t
e
r
t
u
r
n
o
u
t
,
 
d
i
s
t
a
n
c
e
t
o
 
s
t
a
t
e
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
.
 
 
M
a
y
o
r
’
s
 
p
a
r
t
y
 
a
f
f
i
l
i
a
t
i
o
n
 
a
r
e
 
a
 
s
e
t
 
o
f
 
d
u
m
m
y
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
 
f
o
r
 
e
a
c
h
 
p
o
l
i
t
i
c
a
l
 
p
a
r
t
y
.
M
a
j
o
r
’
s
 
c
h
a
r
a
c
t
e
r
i
s
t
i
c
s
:
 
f
i
r
s
t
-
t
e
r
m
m
a
y
o
r
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
,
 
e
d
u
c
a
t
i
o
n
 
l
e
v
e
l
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
s
,
 
m
a
l
e
 
d
u
m
m
y
 
a
n
d
 
a
g
e
.
 
 
F
-
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
s
 
t
e
s
t
 
t
h
e
 
j
o
i
n
t
 
n
u
l
l
 
h
y
p
o
t
h
e
s
e
s
 
t
h
a
t
 
n
o
n
e
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
m
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
y
 
c
h
a
r
a
c
t
e
r
i
s
t
i
c
s
 
/
 
p
a
r
t
y
 
a
f
f
i
l
i
a
t
i
o
n
d
u
m
m
i
e
s
 
/
 
m
a
y
o
r
’
s
 
c
h
a
r
a
c
t
e
r
i
s
t
i
c
s
 
p
r
e
d
i
c
t
t
h
e
 
o
u
t
c
o
m
e
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
.
 
A
l
l
 
s
p
e
c
i
f
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
 
s
t
a
t
e
 
f
i
x
e
d
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
.
S
a
m
p
l
e
 
r
e
s
t
r
i
c
t
e
d
 
t
o
 
m
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
i
e
s
 
a
u
d
i
t
e
d
 
t
h
r
o
u
g
h
 
r
o
u
n
d
 
2
1
.
 
 
S
a
m
p
l
e
 
e
x
c
l
u
d
e
s
 
s
i
n
g
l
e
-
m
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
y
j
u
d
i
c
i
a
r
y
 
d
i
s
t
r
i
c
t
s
,
 
a
s
 
w
e
l
l
 
a
s
 
m
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
i
e
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
p
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
a
b
o
v
e
 
4
0
’
0
0
0
.
R
o
b
u
s
t
 
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
 
e
r
r
o
r
s
a
r
e
 
g
i
v
e
n
i
n
 
p
a
r
e
n
t
h
e
s
e
s
.
 
*
,
 
*
*
,
 
a
n
d
*
*
*
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
c
e
 
a
t
1
0
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
,
5
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
 
a
n
d
 
1
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
 
l
e
v
e
l
s
 
r
e
s
p
e
c
t
i
v
e
l
y
.
44T
a
b
l
e
1
2
:
I
m
p
a
c
t
o
n
s
e
r
i
o
u
s
p
r
o
c
e
d
u
r
a
l
i
r
r
e
g
u
l
a
r
i
t
i
e
s
D
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
:
s
h
a
r
e
 
o
f
 
i
n
s
p
e
c
t
i
o
n
s
 
w
i
t
h
a
t
 
l
e
a
s
t
 
o
n
e
s
e
r
i
o
u
s
p
r
o
c
e
d
u
r
a
l
 
i
r
r
e
g
u
l
a
r
i
t
y
;
 
m
e
a
n
0
.
5
2
,
 
s
t
d
 
0
.
2
0
P
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
s
p
e
c
i
f
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
:
L
i
n
e
a
r
Q
u
a
d
r
a
t
i
c
C
u
b
i
c
C
u
b
i
c
C
u
b
i
c
C
u
b
i
c
C
u
b
i
c
C
u
b
i
c
J
u
d
i
c
i
a
r
y
 
s
e
a
t
 
(
0
/
1
)
-
0
.
0
4
1
-
0
.
0
3
0
-
0
.
0
3
1
-
0
.
0
0
6
-
0
.
0
3
3
-
0
.
0
3
6
-
0
.
0
0
7
-
0
.
0
1
2
(
0
.
0
2
9
)
(
0
.
0
2
9
)
(
0
.
0
2
9
)
(
0
.
0
3
4
)
(
0
.
0
3
0
)
(
0
.
0
3
0
)
(
0
.
0
3
4
)
(
0
.
0
3
5
)
M
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
y
 
c
h
a
r
a
c
t
e
r
i
s
t
i
c
s
N
N
N
Y
N
N
Y
Y
F
-
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
1
.
4
3
1
.
9
0
1
.
8
2
(
p
-
v
a
l
u
e
)
(
0
.
1
5
)
(
0
.
0
3
)
(
0
.
0
4
)
M
a
y
o
r
’
s
 
p
a
r
t
y
 
a
f
f
i
l
i
a
t
i
o
n
N
N
N
N
Y
N
Y
Y
F
-
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
6
.
5
4
3
.
4
6
2
.
8
0
(
p
-
v
a
l
u
e
)
(
0
.
0
0
)
(
0
.
0
0
)
(
0
.
0
0
)
M
a
y
o
r
’
s
 
c
h
a
r
a
c
t
e
r
i
s
t
i
c
s
N
N
N
N
N
Y
N
Y
F
-
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
0
.
9
9
1
.
2
3
(
p
-
v
a
l
u
e
)
(
0
.
4
4
)
(
0
.
2
7
)
O
b
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
o
n
s
7
2
1
7
2
1
7
2
1
7
2
1
7
2
1
7
1
3
7
2
1
7
1
3
R
-
s
q
u
a
r
e
d
0
.
1
4
3
0
.
1
4
8
0
.
1
5
0
0
.
1
7
6
0
.
1
7
9
0
.
1
5
5
0
.
2
1
2
0
.
1
8
4
N
o
t
e
s
:
 
I
V
 
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
i
o
n
s
.
T
h
e
 
i
n
s
t
r
u
m
e
n
t
 
f
o
r
 
j
u
d
i
c
i
a
r
y
 
s
e
a
t
 
i
s
t
h
e
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
 
f
o
r
 
j
u
d
i
c
i
a
r
y
-
d
i
s
t
r
i
c
t
-
s
p
e
c
i
f
i
c
m
a
x
i
m
u
m
 
p
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
.
M
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
y
 
c
h
a
r
a
c
t
e
r
i
s
t
i
c
s
,
 
a
l
l
 
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
d
 
i
n
 
2
0
0
0
:
j
u
d
i
c
i
a
r
y
 
d
i
s
t
r
i
c
t
 
p
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
,
i
n
c
o
m
e
 
p
e
r
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
,
 
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
y
e
a
r
s
 
o
f
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
i
n
g
,
u
r
b
a
n
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
,
 
p
o
v
e
r
t
y
 
h
e
a
d
c
o
u
n
t
 
r
a
t
i
o
,
 
p
o
v
e
r
t
y
g
a
p
,
 
g
i
n
i
 
c
o
e
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
t
,
 
r
a
d
i
o
 
s
t
a
t
i
o
n
,
 
i
n
t
e
r
n
e
t
 
a
c
c
e
s
s
,
e
l
e
c
t
o
r
a
t
e
 
a
n
d
 
v
o
t
e
r
t
u
r
n
o
u
t
,
 
d
i
s
t
a
n
c
e
t
o
 
s
t
a
t
e
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
.
 
 
M
a
y
o
r
’
s
 
p
a
r
t
y
 
a
f
f
i
l
i
a
t
i
o
n
 
a
r
e
 
a
 
s
e
t
 
o
f
 
d
u
m
m
y
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
 
f
o
r
 
e
a
c
h
 
p
o
l
i
t
i
c
a
l
 
p
a
r
t
y
.
M
a
j
o
r
’
s
 
c
h
a
r
a
c
t
e
r
i
s
t
i
c
s
:
 
f
i
r
s
t
-
t
e
r
m
m
a
y
o
r
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
,
 
e
d
u
c
a
t
i
o
n
 
l
e
v
e
l
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
s
,
 
m
a
l
e
 
d
u
m
m
y
 
a
n
d
 
a
g
e
.
 
 
F
-
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
s
 
t
e
s
t
 
t
h
e
 
j
o
i
n
t
 
n
u
l
l
 
h
y
p
o
t
h
e
s
e
s
 
t
h
a
t
 
n
o
n
e
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
m
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
y
 
c
h
a
r
a
c
t
e
r
i
s
t
i
c
s
 
/
 
p
a
r
t
y
 
a
f
f
i
l
i
a
t
i
o
n
d
u
m
m
i
e
s
 
/
 
m
a
y
o
r
’
s
 
c
h
a
r
a
c
t
e
r
i
s
t
i
c
s
 
p
r
e
d
i
c
t
t
h
e
 
o
u
t
c
o
m
e
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
.
 
A
l
l
 
s
p
e
c
i
f
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
 
s
t
a
t
e
 
f
i
x
e
d
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
.
S
a
m
p
l
e
 
r
e
s
t
r
i
c
t
e
d
 
t
o
 
m
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
i
e
s
 
a
u
d
i
t
e
d
 
t
h
r
o
u
g
h
 
r
o
u
n
d
 
2
1
.
 
 
S
a
m
p
l
e
 
e
x
c
l
u
d
e
s
 
s
i
n
g
l
e
-
m
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
y
j
u
d
i
c
i
a
r
y
 
d
i
s
t
r
i
c
t
s
,
 
a
s
 
w
e
l
l
 
a
s
 
m
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
i
e
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
p
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
a
b
o
v
e
 
4
0
’
0
0
0
.
R
o
b
u
s
t
 
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
 
e
r
r
o
r
s
a
r
e
 
g
i
v
e
n
i
n
 
p
a
r
e
n
t
h
e
s
e
s
.
 
*
,
 
*
*
,
 
a
n
d
*
*
*
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
c
e
 
a
t
1
0
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
,
5
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
 
a
n
d
 
1
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
 
l
e
v
e
l
s
 
r
e
s
p
e
c
t
i
v
e
l
y
.
45T
a
b
l
e
1
3
:
P
l
a
c
e
b
o
t
e
s
t
o
f
t
h
e
e
x
c
l
u
s
i
o
n
r
e
s
t
r
i
c
t
i
o
n
D
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
:
s
h
a
r
e
 
o
f
 
i
n
s
p
e
c
t
i
o
n
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
a
t
 
l
e
a
s
t
 
o
n
e
 
i
r
r
e
g
u
l
a
r
i
t
y
;
 
m
e
a
n
 
0
.
6
6
,
 
s
t
d
 
0
.
1
9
P
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
s
p
e
c
i
f
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
:
L
i
n
e
a
r
Q
u
a
d
r
a
t
i
c
C
u
b
i
c
C
u
b
i
c
C
u
b
i
c
C
u
b
i
c
C
u
b
i
c
C
u
b
i
c
S
e
c
o
n
d
 
p
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
r
a
n
k
 
(
0
/
1
)
-
0
.
0
0
1
0
.
0
0
1
-
0
.
0
0
2
-
0
.
0
0
5
-
0
.
0
0
3
-
0
.
0
0
2
-
0
.
0
0
8
-
0
.
0
0
8
(
0
.
0
1
9
)
(
0
.
0
1
9
)
(
0
.
0
1
9
)
(
0
.
0
2
0
)
(
0
.
0
2
0
)
(
0
.
0
1
9
)
(
0
.
0
2
0
)
(
0
.
0
2
0
)
M
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
y
 
c
h
a
r
a
c
t
e
r
i
s
t
i
c
s
N
N
N
Y
N
N
Y
Y
F
-
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
0
.
7
3
0
.
7
5
0
.
8
0
(
p
-
v
a
l
u
e
)
(
0
.
7
3
)
(
0
.
7
0
)
(
0
.
6
5
)
M
a
y
o
r
’
s
 
p
a
r
t
y
 
a
f
f
i
l
i
a
t
i
o
n
N
N
N
N
Y
N
Y
Y
F
-
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
1
.
3
2
1
.
2
3
1
.
5
3
(
p
-
v
a
l
u
e
)
(
0
.
1
8
)
(
0
.
2
4
)
(
0
.
0
9
)
M
a
y
o
r
’
s
 
c
h
a
r
a
c
t
e
r
i
s
t
i
c
s
N
N
N
N
N
Y
N
Y
F
-
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
0
.
9
1
1
.
0
6
(
p
-
v
a
l
u
e
)
(
0
.
5
2
)
(
0
.
3
9
)
O
b
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
o
n
s
4
7
9
4
7
9
4
7
9
4
7
9
4
7
9
4
7
6
4
7
9
4
7
6
R
-
s
q
u
a
r
e
d
0
.
1
7
9
0
.
1
7
9
0
.
1
8
4
0
.
2
0
0
0
.
2
1
2
0
.
1
9
8
0
.
2
2
8
0
.
2
4
8
N
o
t
e
s
:
O
L
S
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
i
o
n
s
.
S
e
c
o
n
d
 
p
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
r
a
n
k
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
s
 
t
h
a
t
 
t
h
e
 
m
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
y
 
h
a
s
 
t
h
e
 
s
e
c
o
n
d
-
l
a
r
g
e
s
t
 
p
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
i
n
 
i
t
s
 
j
u
d
i
c
i
a
r
y
d
i
s
t
r
i
c
t
 
b
a
s
e
d
 
o
n
 
2
0
0
5
 
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
d
 
p
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
.
M
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
y
 
c
h
a
r
a
c
t
e
r
i
s
t
i
c
s
,
 
a
l
l
 
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
d
 
i
n
 
2
0
0
0
:
j
u
d
i
c
i
a
r
y
 
d
i
s
t
r
i
c
t
 
p
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
,
i
n
c
o
m
e
p
e
r
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
,
 
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
y
e
a
r
s
 
o
f
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
i
n
g
,
 
u
r
b
a
n
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
,
 
p
o
v
e
r
t
y
 
h
e
a
d
c
o
u
n
t
 
r
a
t
i
o
,
 
p
o
v
e
r
t
y
g
a
p
,
 
g
i
n
i
 
c
o
e
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
t
,
 
r
a
d
i
o
 
s
t
a
t
i
o
n
,
 
i
n
t
e
r
n
e
t
 
a
c
c
e
s
s
,
e
l
e
c
t
o
r
a
t
e
 
a
n
d
 
v
o
t
e
r
t
u
r
n
o
u
t
,
 
d
i
s
t
a
n
c
e
 
t
o
 
s
t
a
t
e
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
.
 
 
M
a
y
o
r
’
s
 
p
a
r
t
y
 
a
f
f
i
l
i
a
t
i
o
n
 
a
r
e
 
a
 
s
e
t
 
o
f
 
d
u
m
m
y
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
 
f
o
r
 
e
a
c
h
 
p
o
l
i
t
i
c
a
l
 
p
a
r
t
y
.
M
a
j
o
r
’
s
 
c
h
a
r
a
c
t
e
r
i
s
t
i
c
s
:
 
f
i
r
s
t
-
t
e
r
m
 
m
a
y
o
r
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
,
 
e
d
u
c
a
t
i
o
n
 
l
e
v
e
l
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
s
,
 
m
a
l
e
 
d
u
m
m
y
 
a
n
d
 
a
g
e
.
 
 
F
-
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
s
 
t
e
s
t
 
t
h
e
 
j
o
i
n
t
 
n
u
l
l
h
y
p
o
t
h
e
s
e
s
 
t
h
a
t
 
n
o
n
e
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
m
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
y
 
c
h
a
r
a
c
t
e
r
i
s
t
i
c
s
 
/
 
p
a
r
t
y
 
a
f
f
i
l
i
a
t
i
o
n
d
u
m
m
i
e
s
 
/
 
m
a
y
o
r
’
s
 
c
h
a
r
a
c
t
e
r
i
s
t
i
c
s
 
p
r
e
d
i
c
t
t
h
e
 
o
u
t
c
o
m
e
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
.
 
A
l
l
 
s
p
e
c
i
f
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
 
s
t
a
t
e
 
f
i
x
e
d
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
.
S
a
m
p
l
e
 
r
e
s
t
r
i
c
t
e
d
 
t
o
 
m
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
i
e
s
 
a
u
d
i
t
e
d
 
t
h
r
o
u
g
h
 
r
o
u
n
d
 
2
1
.
 
 
S
a
m
p
l
e
 
e
x
c
l
u
d
e
s
s
i
n
g
l
e
-
m
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
y
 
j
u
d
i
c
i
a
r
y
 
d
i
s
t
r
i
c
t
s
,
 
t
o
p
-
r
a
n
k
e
d
 
m
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
i
e
s
 
i
n
 
m
u
l
t
i
-
c
o
u
n
t
y
 
d
i
s
t
r
i
c
t
s
,
 
w
e
l
l
 
a
s
 
m
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
i
e
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
p
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
a
b
o
v
e
4
0
’
0
0
0
.
R
o
b
u
s
t
 
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
 
e
r
r
o
r
s
a
r
e
 
g
i
v
e
n
i
n
 
p
a
r
e
n
t
h
e
s
e
s
.
 
*
,
 
*
*
,
 
a
n
d
 
*
*
*
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
c
e
 
a
t
1
0
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
,
5
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
 
a
n
d
 
1
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
l
e
v
e
l
s
 
r
e
s
p
e
c
t
i
v
e
l
y
.
46T
a
b
l
e
1
4
:
I
m
p
a
c
t
o
n
t
o
t
a
l
i
r
r
e
g
u
l
a
r
i
t
i
e
s
f
o
r
￿
r
s
t
-
a
n
d
s
e
c
o
n
d
-
t
e
r
m
m
a
y
o
r
s
D
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
:
s
h
a
r
e
 
o
f
 
i
n
s
p
e
c
t
i
o
n
s
 
w
i
t
h
a
t
 
l
e
a
s
t
 
o
n
e
 
i
r
r
e
g
u
l
a
r
i
t
y
;
 
m
e
a
n
 
0
.
6
7
,
 
s
t
d
 
0
.
1
9
P
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
s
p
e
c
i
f
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
:
L
i
n
e
a
r
Q
u
a
d
r
a
t
i
c
C
u
b
i
c
C
u
b
i
c
C
u
b
i
c
C
u
b
i
c
C
u
b
i
c
C
u
b
i
c
J
u
d
i
c
i
a
r
y
 
s
e
a
t
(
0
/
1
)
0
.
0
0
2
-
0
.
0
0
7
-
0
.
0
0
6
0
.
0
0
4
0
.
0
0
6
-
0
.
0
1
0
0
.
0
1
9
0
.
0
1
3
(
0
.
0
3
5
)
(
0
.
0
3
6
)
(
0
.
0
3
6
)
(
0
.
0
4
1
)
(
0
.
0
3
8
)
(
0
.
0
3
6
)
(
0
.
0
4
4
)
(
0
.
0
4
4
)
J
u
d
i
c
i
a
r
y
 
s
e
a
t
(
0
/
1
)
×
-
0
.
0
6
6
-
0
.
0
7
1
-
0
.
0
7
1
-
0
.
1
0
3
*
-
0
.
0
8
9
*
-
0
.
0
6
2
-
0
.
1
2
6
*
*
-
0
.
1
2
2
*
F
i
r
s
t
-
t
e
r
m
 
m
a
y
o
r
(
0
/
1
)
(
0
.
0
4
7
)
(
0
.
0
4
9
)
(
0
.
0
4
9
)
(
0
.
0
5
8
)
(
0
.
0
5
1
)
(
0
.
0
4
9
)
(
0
.
0
6
2
)
(
0
.
0
6
3
)
F
-
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
 
f
o
r
 
H
0
:
 
β
1
+
 
β
2
=
0
4
.
2
7
5
.
5
4
5
.
6
2
5
.
7
6
5
.
8
2
4
.
7
0
6
.
0
6
5
.
8
3
(
p
-
v
a
l
u
e
)
(
0
.
0
4
)
(
0
.
0
2
)
(
0
.
0
2
)
(
0
.
0
2
)
(
0
.
0
2
)
(
0
.
0
3
)
(
0
.
0
1
)
(
0
.
0
2
)
M
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
y
 
c
h
a
r
a
c
t
e
r
i
s
t
i
c
s
N
N
N
Y
N
N
Y
Y
F
-
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
0
.
9
6
0
.
9
8
1
.
0
8
(
p
-
v
a
l
u
e
)
(
0
.
5
1
)
(
0
.
4
9
)
(
0
.
3
6
)
M
a
y
o
r
’
s
 
p
a
r
t
y
 
a
f
f
i
l
i
a
t
i
o
n
N
N
N
N
Y
N
Y
Y
F
-
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
1
6
.
1
5
.
1
2
5
.
0
5
(
p
-
v
a
l
u
e
)
(
0
.
0
0
)
(
0
.
0
0
)
(
0
.
0
0
)
M
a
y
o
r
’
s
 
c
h
a
r
a
c
t
e
r
i
s
t
i
c
s
N
N
N
N
N
Y
N
Y
F
-
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
0
.
5
5
0
.
5
8
(
p
-
v
a
l
u
e
)
(
0
.
9
2
)
(
0
.
8
8
)
O
b
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
o
n
s
7
2
1
7
2
1
7
2
1
7
2
1
7
2
1
7
1
3
7
2
1
7
1
3
R
-
s
q
u
a
r
e
d
0
.
2
0
2
0
.
2
0
0
0
.
2
0
0
0
.
2
1
9
0
.
2
4
4
0
.
2
1
0
0
.
2
6
2
0
.
2
7
0
N
o
t
e
s
:
S
e
p
a
r
a
t
e
I
V
 
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
s
a
m
p
l
e
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
f
i
r
s
t
-
t
e
r
m
 
m
a
y
o
r
s
 
a
n
d
 
s
e
c
o
n
d
-
t
e
r
m
 
m
a
y
o
r
s
.
T
h
e
 
i
n
s
t
r
u
m
e
n
t
 
f
o
r
 
j
u
d
i
c
i
a
r
y
 
s
e
a
t
 
i
s
t
h
e
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
 
f
o
r
 
j
u
d
i
c
i
a
r
y
-
d
i
s
t
r
i
c
t
-
s
p
e
c
i
f
i
c
m
a
x
i
m
u
m
 
p
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
.
M
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
y
 
c
h
a
r
a
c
t
e
r
i
s
t
i
c
s
,
 
a
l
l
 
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
d
 
i
n
 
2
0
0
0
:
j
u
d
i
c
i
a
r
y
 
d
i
s
t
r
i
c
t
 
p
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
,
i
n
c
o
m
e
 
p
e
r
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
,
 
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
y
e
a
r
s
 
o
f
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
i
n
g
,
 
u
r
b
a
n
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
,
 
p
o
v
e
r
t
y
 
h
e
a
d
c
o
u
n
t
 
r
a
t
i
o
,
 
p
o
v
e
r
t
y
g
a
p
,
 
g
i
n
i
 
c
o
e
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
t
,
 
r
a
d
i
o
 
s
t
a
t
i
o
n
,
 
i
n
t
e
r
n
e
t
 
a
c
c
e
s
s
,
e
l
e
c
t
o
r
a
t
e
 
a
n
d
 
v
o
t
e
r
t
u
r
n
o
u
t
,
 
d
i
s
t
a
n
c
e
 
t
o
 
s
t
a
t
e
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
.
 
 
M
a
y
o
r
’
s
 
p
a
r
t
y
 
a
f
f
i
l
i
a
t
i
o
n
 
a
r
e
 
a
 
s
e
t
 
o
f
 
d
u
m
m
y
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
 
f
o
r
 
e
a
c
h
 
p
o
l
i
t
i
c
a
l
 
p
a
r
t
y
.
M
a
j
o
r
’
s
c
h
a
r
a
c
t
e
r
i
s
t
i
c
s
:
 
f
i
r
s
t
-
t
e
r
m
 
m
a
y
o
r
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
,
 
e
d
u
c
a
t
i
o
n
 
l
e
v
e
l
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
s
,
 
m
a
l
e
 
d
u
m
m
y
 
a
n
d
 
a
g
e
.
 
 
F
-
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
s
 
t
e
s
t
 
t
h
e
 
j
o
i
n
t
 
n
u
l
l
 
h
y
p
o
t
h
e
s
e
s
 
t
h
a
t
 
n
o
n
e
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
m
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
y
 
c
h
a
r
a
c
t
e
r
i
s
t
i
c
s
 
/
 
p
a
r
t
y
 
a
f
f
i
l
i
a
t
i
o
n
d
u
m
m
i
e
s
 
/
 
m
a
y
o
r
’
s
 
c
h
a
r
a
c
t
e
r
i
s
t
i
c
s
 
p
r
e
d
i
c
t
t
h
e
 
o
u
t
c
o
m
e
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
.
 
A
l
l
 
s
p
e
c
i
f
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
s
t
a
t
e
 
f
i
x
e
d
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
.
S
a
m
p
l
e
 
r
e
s
t
r
i
c
t
e
d
 
t
o
 
m
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
i
e
s
 
a
u
d
i
t
e
d
 
t
h
r
o
u
g
h
 
r
o
u
n
d
 
2
1
.
 
 
S
a
m
p
l
e
 
e
x
c
l
u
d
e
s
 
s
i
n
g
l
e
-
m
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
y
 
j
u
d
i
c
i
a
r
y
 
d
i
s
t
r
i
c
t
s
,
 
a
s
w
e
l
l
 
a
s
 
m
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
i
e
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
p
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
a
b
o
v
e
 
4
0
’
0
0
0
.
R
o
b
u
s
t
 
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
 
e
r
r
o
r
s
a
r
e
 
g
i
v
e
n
i
n
 
p
a
r
e
n
t
h
e
s
e
s
.
 
*
,
 
*
*
,
 
a
n
d
 
*
*
*
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
c
e
 
a
t
1
0
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
,
5
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
 
a
n
d
 
1
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
 
l
e
v
e
l
s
 
r
e
s
p
e
c
t
i
v
e
l
y
.
47T
a
b
l
e
1
5
:
I
m
p
a
c
t
o
n
m
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t
i
r
r
e
g
u
l
a
r
i
t
i
e
s
f
o
r
￿
r
s
t
-
a
n
d
s
e
c
o
n
d
-
t
e
r
m
m
a
y
o
r
s
D
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
:
s
h
a
r
e
 
o
f
 
i
n
s
p
e
c
t
i
o
n
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
a
t
 
l
e
a
s
t
 
o
n
e
 
m
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t
 
i
r
r
e
g
u
l
a
r
i
t
y
;
 
m
e
a
n
 
0
.
4
4
,
 
s
t
d
 
0
.
1
6
P
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
s
p
e
c
i
f
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
:
L
i
n
e
a
r
Q
u
a
d
r
a
t
i
c
C
u
b
i
c
C
u
b
i
c
C
u
b
i
c
C
u
b
i
c
C
u
b
i
c
C
u
b
i
c
J
u
d
i
c
i
a
r
y
 
s
e
a
t
(
0
/
1
)
0
.
0
1
1
-
0
.
0
0
2
-
0
.
0
0
1
0
.
0
2
3
0
.
0
1
4
-
0
.
0
0
5
0
.
0
3
8
0
.
0
3
3
(
0
.
0
3
3
)
(
0
.
0
3
5
)
(
0
.
0
3
5
)
(
0
.
0
3
9
)
(
0
.
0
3
5
)
(
0
.
0
3
4
)
(
0
.
0
4
1
)
(
0
.
0
4
0
)
J
u
d
i
c
i
a
r
y
 
s
e
a
t
(
0
/
1
)
×
-
0
.
0
6
7
-
0
.
0
7
1
-
0
.
0
7
2
-
0
.
1
1
2
*
*
-
0
.
0
8
8
*
-
0
.
0
6
6
-
0
.
1
3
2
*
*
-
0
.
1
2
8
*
*
F
i
r
s
t
-
t
e
r
m
 
m
a
y
o
r
(
0
/
1
)
(
0
.
0
4
3
)
(
0
.
0
4
5
)
(
0
.
0
4
5
)
(
0
.
0
5
2
)
(
0
.
0
4
5
)
(
0
.
0
4
5
)
(
0
.
0
5
4
)
(
0
.
0
5
4
)
F
-
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
 
f
o
r
H
0
:
 
β
1
+
 
β
2
=
0
4
.
0
0
6
.
5
8
6
.
6
7
6
.
7
9
6
.
3
0
5
.
9
5
7
.
0
9
6
.
9
8
(
p
-
v
a
l
u
e
)
(
0
.
0
5
)
(
0
.
0
1
)
(
0
.
0
1
)
(
0
.
0
1
)
(
0
.
0
1
)
(
0
.
0
2
)
(
0
.
0
1
)
(
0
.
0
1
)
M
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
y
 
c
h
a
r
a
c
t
e
r
i
s
t
i
c
s
N
N
N
Y
N
N
Y
Y
F
-
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
1
.
3
7
1
.
2
5
1
.
2
2
(
p
-
v
a
l
u
e
)
(
0
.
1
2
)
(
0
.
1
9
)
(
0
.
2
1
)
M
a
y
o
r
’
s
 
p
a
r
t
y
 
a
f
f
i
l
i
a
t
i
o
n
N
N
N
N
Y
N
Y
Y
F
-
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
4
3
.
7
4
.
2
6
3
.
1
6
(
p
-
v
a
l
u
e
)
(
0
.
0
0
)
(
0
.
0
0
)
(
0
.
0
0
)
M
a
y
o
r
’
s
 
c
h
a
r
a
c
t
e
r
i
s
t
i
c
s
N
N
N
N
N
Y
N
Y
F
-
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
0
.
8
8
0
.
8
1
(
p
-
v
a
l
u
e
)
(
0
.
6
0
)
(
0
.
6
5
)
O
b
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
o
n
s
7
2
1
7
2
1
7
2
1
7
2
1
7
2
1
7
1
3
7
2
1
7
1
3
R
-
s
q
u
a
r
e
d
0
.
1
9
7
0
.
2
0
0
0
.
2
0
1
0
.
2
3
2
0
.
2
4
4
0
.
2
2
0
0
.
2
7
3
0
.
2
8
9
N
o
t
e
s
:
S
e
p
a
r
a
t
e
I
V
 
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
s
a
m
p
l
e
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
f
i
r
s
t
-
t
e
r
m
 
m
a
y
o
r
s
 
a
n
d
 
s
e
c
o
n
d
-
t
e
r
m
 
m
a
y
o
r
s
.
T
h
e
 
i
n
s
t
r
u
m
e
n
t
 
f
o
r
 
j
u
d
i
c
i
a
r
y
 
s
e
a
t
 
i
s
t
h
e
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
 
f
o
r
 
j
u
d
i
c
i
a
r
y
-
d
i
s
t
r
i
c
t
-
s
p
e
c
i
f
i
c
m
a
x
i
m
u
m
 
p
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
.
M
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
y
 
c
h
a
r
a
c
t
e
r
i
s
t
i
c
s
,
 
a
l
l
 
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
d
 
i
n
 
2
0
0
0
:
j
u
d
i
c
i
a
r
y
 
d
i
s
t
r
i
c
t
 
p
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
,
i
n
c
o
m
e
 
p
e
r
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
,
 
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
y
e
a
r
s
 
o
f
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
i
n
g
,
 
u
r
b
a
n
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
,
 
p
o
v
e
r
t
y
 
h
e
a
d
c
o
u
n
t
 
r
a
t
i
o
,
 
p
o
v
e
r
t
y
g
a
p
,
 
g
i
n
i
 
c
o
e
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
t
,
 
r
a
d
i
o
 
s
t
a
t
i
o
n
,
 
i
n
t
e
r
n
e
t
a
c
c
e
s
s
,
e
l
e
c
t
o
r
a
t
e
 
a
n
d
 
v
o
t
e
r
t
u
r
n
o
u
t
,
 
d
i
s
t
a
n
c
e
 
t
o
 
s
t
a
t
e
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
.
 
 
M
a
y
o
r
’
s
 
p
a
r
t
y
 
a
f
f
i
l
i
a
t
i
o
n
 
a
r
e
 
a
 
s
e
t
 
o
f
 
d
u
m
m
y
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
 
f
o
r
 
e
a
c
h
 
p
o
l
i
t
i
c
a
l
 
p
a
r
t
y
.
M
a
j
o
r
’
s
 
c
h
a
r
a
c
t
e
r
i
s
t
i
c
s
:
 
f
i
r
s
t
-
t
e
r
m
 
m
a
y
o
r
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
,
 
e
d
u
c
a
t
i
o
n
 
l
e
v
e
l
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
s
,
 
m
a
l
e
 
d
u
m
m
y
 
a
n
d
 
a
g
e
.
 
 
F
-
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
s
 
t
e
s
t
 
t
h
e
 
j
o
i
n
t
 
n
u
l
l
 
h
y
p
o
t
h
e
s
e
s
t
h
a
t
 
n
o
n
e
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
m
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
y
 
c
h
a
r
a
c
t
e
r
i
s
t
i
c
s
 
/
 
p
a
r
t
y
 
a
f
f
i
l
i
a
t
i
o
n
d
u
m
m
i
e
s
 
/
 
m
a
y
o
r
’
s
 
c
h
a
r
a
c
t
e
r
i
s
t
i
c
s
 
p
r
e
d
i
c
t
t
h
e
 
o
u
t
c
o
m
e
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
.
 
A
l
l
s
p
e
c
i
f
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
 
s
t
a
t
e
 
f
i
x
e
d
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
.
 
 
S
a
m
p
l
e
 
r
e
s
t
r
i
c
t
e
d
 
t
o
 
m
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
i
e
s
 
a
u
d
i
t
e
d
 
t
h
r
o
u
g
h
 
r
o
u
n
d
 
2
1
.
 
 
S
a
m
p
l
e
 
e
x
c
l
u
d
e
s
 
s
i
n
g
l
e
-
m
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
y
j
u
d
i
c
i
a
r
y
 
d
i
s
t
r
i
c
t
s
,
 
a
s
 
w
e
l
l
 
a
s
 
m
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
i
e
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
p
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
a
b
o
v
e
 
4
0
’
0
0
0
.
 
 
R
o
b
u
s
t
 
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
 
e
r
r
o
r
s
a
r
e
 
g
i
v
e
n
i
n
 
p
a
r
e
n
t
h
e
s
e
s
.
 
*
,
 
*
*
,
 
a
n
d
 
*
*
*
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
c
e
 
a
t
1
0
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
,
5
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
 
a
n
d
 
1
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
 
l
e
v
e
l
s
 
r
e
s
p
e
c
t
i
v
e
l
y
.
48F
i
g
u
r
e
1
:
H
i
s
t
o
g
r
a
m
s
o
f
m
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
y
p
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
b
y
p
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
r
a
n
k
0
2
0
4
0
6
0
4
0
'
0
0
0
1
0
0
'
0
0
0
4
0
'
0
0
0
1
0
0
'
0
0
0
N
o
t
 
t
o
p
-
r
a
n
k
e
d
 
(
Z
=
0
)
T
o
p
 
r
a
n
k
e
d
 
(
Z
=
1
)
F
r
e
q
u
e
n
c
y
Y
e
a
r
 
2
0
0
0
 
(
c
e
n
s
u
s
)
 
m
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
y
 
p
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
N
o
t
e
s
:
 
Z
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
s
 
j
u
d
i
c
i
a
r
y
-
d
i
s
t
r
i
c
t
-
s
p
e
c
i
f
i
c
 
t
o
p
 
r
a
n
k
 
i
n
 
t
e
r
m
s
 
o
f
 
o
f
f
i
c
i
a
l
 
2
0
0
5
 
p
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
.
 
S
a
m
p
l
e
 
i
s
 
r
e
s
t
r
i
c
t
e
d
 
t
o
m
u
l
t
i
-
c
o
u
n
t
y
 
j
u
d
i
c
i
a
r
y
 
d
i
s
t
r
i
c
t
s
 
a
n
d
 
m
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
i
e
s
 
f
o
r
 
w
h
i
c
h
 
a
u
d
i
t
 
d
a
t
a
 
a
r
e
 
a
v
a
i
l
a
b
l
e
.
49